Economic assistance to Turkey from Europe and the United States by Jones, Defne
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Mema and Papa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY FROM EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
 
 
DEFNE JONES 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
in 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
December 2004 
 
 
 
D
EFN
E JO
N
ES 
 
 
EC
O
N
O
M
IC
 A
SSISTA
N
C
E TO
 TU
R
K
EY 
BILK
EN
T 2004
 ii
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, 
in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of IR in 
International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Assistant Professor Ali Tekin          
               Supervisor 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, 
in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of IR in 
International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         (Assistant Professor Ömer Faruk Genҫkaya) 
         Examining Committee Member 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, 
in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of IR in 
International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         (Assistant Professor Paul Williams) 
         Examining Committee Member 
 
 
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         (Professor Erdal Erel) 
              Director 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY FROM EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
Jones, Defne 
MIR, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Ali Tekin 
 
December 2004 
 
 
 This thesis examines the extent, limitations, and effects of foreign aid 
to Turkey from the United States, Europe, and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs).  It also interprets the evolution of the concept of 
conditionality attached to economic assistance by the donors.  After 
evaluating the main arguments of liberal and dependency perspectives on 
foreign aid to developing countries, the thesis makes the argument that 
under certain circumstances foreign aid can lead to economic and social 
development.   
 iv
Conditionality plays an important role in ensuring effectiveness of 
foreign aid.  This study focuses on the evolution of conditionality attached 
to various foreign aid packages for Turkey.  It then evaluates if there is a 
correlation between the conditionality attached and policy results 
considered satisfactory.  The study covers the period of 1945 to 2000.  
Keywords: Turkey, Foreign Aid, Economic Assistance 
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ÖZET 
 
AVRUPA VE AMERIKA: TÜRKIYE’YE GELEN DIŞ YARDIMI 
 
Jones, Defne 
Master, Uluslararasι İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doҫent Ali Tekin 
 
Aralık 2004 
 
 
Bu tez, Türkiye’ye Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Avrupa ve 
Uluslararası Finansal Kuruluşlar tarafından yapılan dış yardımların 
kapsamını, kısıtlarını ve etkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.  Ayrıca bu 
yardımcıların ekonomik desteklerinin şartlılığı yaklaşımının gelişiminin de 
açıklanmasına çalışılmıştır.  Tezde; gelişmekte olan ülkelere finansal 
yardımlar konusunda liberal ve bağımlılık yaklaşımlarının temel 
argümanlarının açıklanmasını ile, belirli koşullar altında dış yardımların 
ekonomik ve sosyal gelişim sağladığı savunulmaktadır.   
 vi
Bu sebeple, şartlılık dış yardımların etkililiğinin sağlanması 
konusunda önemli bir rol oynamaktadır.  Bu çalışma, Türkiye’ye sağlanan 
çeşitli dış yardım paketleriyle birlikte şartlılığın gelişimine odaklanmıştır.  
Ayrıca bu çalışmada, başarılı politika sonuçları ile bağımlılık arasında bir 
ilişki olup olmadığı değerlendirilmiştir.  Çalışma 1945-200 yılları arasını 
kapsamaktadır.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Dış Yardım, Ekonomik Yardım 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Turkey officially received aid from the United States (US) in 1947 
with the advent of the Truman Doctrine.  The US wanted to prevent the 
spread of communism to Greece and Turkey, which were considered 
susceptible to the threat.  Regarding European aid, Turkey had been 
receiving economic assistance formerly under the Ottoman Empire and 
continued to receive minimal amounts during the founding of the Republic 
and throughout the years. 
The evolution of conditionality in terms of economic aid provided 
by the US, EU, and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) will be 
examined in order to determine the relative effectiveness of conditionality.  
When applied in a country-specific manner, conditionality, or policy-based 
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lending, is more likely to accomplish the goals that were set out to be 
achieved given legitimate interaction between lender and borrower.1  On 
the other hand, when conditionality is not specifically targeted to a specific 
aim, it can lead to political turmoil or economic unrest.  Too much reliance 
on economic aid for reforms, in general, creates dependency on Turkey’s 
part towards the West. 
Turkey receives aid from the US and Europe partially based on these 
superpowers personal goals and interests, having a detrimental effect on 
Turkey’s economy if not properly applied.  This creates relatively high 
levels of dependency within the economy on aid from the US, EU, and IFIs.  
Also, it allows foreign countries and IFIs to dictate the nature of economic 
and social developments within society.  Economic dependence occurs 
when one country is linked to another’s economy for development 
purposes (Dos Santos, 1970: 231).  Referring to government documents and 
other sources, the dependent variable, dependency, changes with the 
independent variable, economic assistance, over time. 
The main motivation for aid started with the desire to influence 
Turkey’s internal politics, and shifted in terms of conditionality with time.  
Conditionality as defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) refers 
to changes in economic and financial policies made by governments 
                                            
1 James M. Boughton (2003) makes a similar argument in reference to conditionality 
specific to the IMF. 
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receiving aid (IMF Fact sheet).  Conditionality, when properly applied to 
the circumstances at hand without too many detailed specifications, can 
achieve the goals set forth. 
Turkey has been a committed US ally since the Korean War, which 
started in 1950, when it sent troops to support the US goal of stopping the 
spread of Communism.  In addition, Turkey has cracked down on drug 
traffickers who use the peninsula as a path-way to carry drugs to Europe or 
to the United States.  Struggling with political unrest during the Cold War 
era and continued tense relations with the superpowers made Turkish 
officials suspicious of great power intentions.  In addition, the Cyprus 
intervention caused tension between the two countries even though the US, 
more so than Europe, supported the Turkish side.  During the Gulf War of 
the 1990s, Turkey opened up its air bases for use by the US military for 
enforcement of the no-fly zone over Iraq to protect the Kurds.  More 
recently, Turkey has supported the US war on terrorism not by solely 
paying lip service to it, but by sending some of its own Special Forces 
troops to Afghanistan in order to help track down the perpetrators of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.  
The US has its own interests in maintaining its position as an ally 
with Turkey.  These interests lie in the military, natural resource, and 
investment realms.  Militarily, the US views Turkey as a strategically 
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located country by which to gain access to the Middle East and the former 
Soviet-bloc nations.  Due to Turkey and mainly its neighbors’ vast reserve 
of natural resources, the US does not want to forgo opportunities to benefit.  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey had been expanding until the 
recent economic crisis of 2001, however, it has since continued to grow 
again. 
Turkey has an even longer-standing relationship with Europe, 
mainly due to their geographic proximity to each other.  European 
countries have traded with Turkey since before the foundation of the 
Republic.  However, since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has 
become a peripheral state as opposed to a main player in the regions’ 
politics.  To strengthen its position, Turkey entered into many economic 
agreements with Europe, for example, the Council of Europe, to promote 
democracy and economic prosperity.  Also, Turkey has been an associate 
member of the European Economic Community (EEC) for a longer period 
of time than any other member.  
 European interests in Turkey from a military perspective lie in the 
strength of the Turkish army and its contribution to stability, especially in 
Eastern Europe.  For example, long before the US was willing to take 
decisive action in Bosnia and Kosovo, Turkey was prepared to act.  As far 
as military security interests are concerned, Turkey’s status as a member of 
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the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the second largest 
army in that organization, provides stability for the Europeans as long as 
peace is maintained.  Turkey is also seen as a possible gateway for 
transmitting oil and gas resources that Europe needs.  In terms of 
investment, Turkey provides an extensive market for European goods.    
Aid packages from the US have been consistent since the end of 
World War II (WWII).  Foreign aid is approved by the Congress each fiscal 
year in the hopes of maintaining a strong relationship between the two 
countries.  However, the US, as compared to other Western countries, 
provides one of the lowest amounts of foreign aid in terms of its budget 
share. 
 The EU also has its reasons for providing funding for Turkey, 
oftentimes in the hopes that it will decrease human rights violations.  This 
is one of the main points of conditionality on the part of the EU.  Due to the 
relative problems of transparency, until the EU is ensured that aid is 
serving the purpose it was intended for, large sums of money will be 
withheld. 
 IFIs have also played a pivotal role in supplying aid to Turkey.  The 
role of the World Bank has traditionally been seen as providing money to 
countries to help build a general infrastructure (House Hearing, 2001: 3).  
More recently, the World Bank has provided short-term structural 
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adjustment loans.  The World Bank provides loans to Turkey at low rates of 
interest that it expects to be paid back.  World Bank conditionality is linked 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and shows progress; 
modification throughout the years. 
 The IMF has played a pivotal role in supporting the Turkish 
economy, most favorably with the advent of the 2001 economic crisis.  
Turkey has signed about eighteen standby agreements with the IMF in 
order to obtain loans.  However, as part of conditionality, the IMF has put 
forth certain reforms that it wants Turkey to undertake in order to be able 
to keep receiving aid. 
 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) provides aid to developing countries to enhance their economies.  
In addition, the OECD conducts major statistical surveys on the nature of 
the economies that it provides aid for.  Also, Turkey is compared to other 
OECD countries when establishing a comparative analysis to determine 
attainment of goals. 
For considering Turkey’s experience with foreign aid, the post-
WWII period will be focused on to develop a better understanding of the 
current and future possibilities for Turkey’s economy.  Although 
historically, the Ottoman experience with aid had a significant impact on 
the Republic’s attitude towards assistance, this impact waned in later years.  
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The Ottoman era, in the late period, was key in establishing a tradition of 
dependency on the West as a foundation for future aid experiences. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH ITS ALLIES 
 
 
 Historically, the Republic of Turkey, as the remnant of the Ottoman 
Empire, has been an outward looking nation.  Since the Empire 
encompassed parts of Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, the 
Ottomans became accustomed to adapting to many different cultures.  The 
legacy that the Ottoman Empire left the Turkish state initially drove the 
new Republic to follow an isolationist stance, but later encouraged the 
Turkish people to recall the multinational nature of their empire and start 
looking outwards mainly to the West.  In the final years of the Ottoman 
Empire, a significant amount of debt had been incurred with the Western 
Europeans.  So as not to continue the same tradition, the new Republic was 
initially a bit more cautious about borrowing and spending.  Many 
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countries in one way or another accumulate large amounts of debt; 
however, they usually have economies strong enough to handle the debt 
burden.  Turkey, especially towards the emergence of the Republic, had a 
relatively weak economy on which large amounts of debt had a 
detrimental effect.  As Turkey strengthened its relations with the West it 
also increased its dependency on economic assistance.  Over the years, the 
US has assumed the role of the major supplier of economic assistance to 
Turkey while also being one of its closest allies. 
 
 
2.1 The United States as an Ally 
 
In order to understand Turkey’s opening up to the West and to the 
United States, in particular, it is important to examine Turkey’s 
democratization and move towards western liberal ideals.  In addition, 
ever since the WWII period to the present, the country’s role in the region 
and as an ally has shifted.  Adjustments in Turkey’s outlook towards the 
US and the West mainly started to come about during WWII.   
The impact of WWII on Turkey is important in understanding the 
first major set of fundamental changes that started to take place in the 
decade of the 1950s.  Originally, Turkey’s goal in WWII was to remain 
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neutral.  However, towards the end of the war it sided with the allies in 
order to be considered a faithful supporter of the West.  Through the use of 
its unique geographical position, Turkey was able to come out of the War 
without too much entanglement or destruction (Deringil, 1989: 186).  
Countries unwilling to invade were wary of offending Turkey because of 
its strategic location, which could be used to their advantage at some point 
in time.  The aftermath of WWII was much more favorable for Turkey 
when compared to World War I, thus increasing confidence in a more 
active foreign policy for the future.   
With the victory of the Allied powers, new liberal ideals were 
coming to the fore and being adopted by the rising bourgeois classes.  
These liberal ideals pertained to the rights of the individual.  After WWII 
and the victory of the democracies, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) 
began to fully understand the importance of democratic and liberal ideals 
within the government and began to implement them.  The pressure from 
outside forces was significant in determining the internal structure of the 
political system.  Even though the Constitution of 1924 contained liberal 
ideals that gave rights to the individual, the fulfillment of those rights was 
restricted (Karpat, 1967: 137).  Most hoped that the introduction of an 
opposition party, at this juncture, would increase the checks and balances 
within the system in order to not allow the RPP to dominate the political 
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scene.  In an attempt to foster a more positive image among the people, 
around 1945 the RPP paid close attention to certain cultural foundations, 
agencies for aid, political advancement societies, and sporting clubs 
(Kabasakal, 1991: 152).  Governmental interest in such civic activities 
helped promote liberal ideas throughout the decade.  As Turkey increased 
efforts to Westernize, the US was able to provide more financial backing to 
help improve the economy and social situation. 
The increasing amount of aid that Turkey was receiving after the 
end of the war from aid packages such as the Truman Doctrine increased 
Turkey’s dependence on other states, thus requiring that the political 
system adhere to Western standards of governance.  The United States 
government was looking for a way to help stop the spread of Soviet 
influences, the aim of the early political conditionality placed on aid.  In 
1946, the Truman Doctrine was expressed as a decision to “support free 
people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or 
outside pressures” (Pope, 1997: 82).  In the Turkish context, the protection 
of the Straits was important to US military interests.   
Following the Truman Doctrine, the Greco-Turkish Aid Program 
was approved to provide aid for Greece in the sum of 250 million dollars 
and 150 million dollars for Turkey and was signed into law on March 22, 
1947 (Freeland, 1972: 88).  According to the agreement, monetary aid for 
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Turkey was designed specifically for the military.  To establish Turkish and 
Greek support and stop the spread of Communism, the US saw aid to these 
countries as a necessary step.  On the flip side, in order to gain the aid and 
support of the US, Turkey wanted to change its political system to better 
suit the expectations of the West.   
Later in the 1950s, in order to foster the growth of the middle class, 
the United States provided aid to certain commercial groups, which made 
the foundation of democracy stronger, because these groups were 
generally opposed to bureaucratic domination and dictatorship (Karpat, 
1964: 60).  Thus, the policies of support for commercial groups would help 
foster opposition to étatist policies, which would encourage the growth of 
new pro-Western ideologies.  Apparently, the next phase of conditionality, 
after the threat of Communism subsided, was to encourage privatization 
and strengthen democracy. 
Another big step that Turkey took in strengthening its relationship 
with the US was joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
After joining NATO in 1952, Turkey officially became more involved in 
world affairs and was now viewed as a strategic buffer zone between the 
Soviet bloc and Western Europe.  Military officials recognized Turkey’s 
role in protecting the “West’s southern flank in Europe, in diverting large 
numbers of Soviet troops to the Turkish theater, and in facilitating defense 
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of the Mediterranean and the Middle East” (Leffler, 1985: 823).  The United 
States played a pivotal role in making the other allies understand the 
importance of Turkey’s potential membership in NATO.  In 1951 when the 
Assistant Secretary of State, George C. McGhee, visited Turkey, he was told 
by President Celâl Bayar that Turkey would not settle for anything less 
than full NATO membership given its strategic importance and its role in 
the Korean War (Leffler, 1985: 822).  The country suffered many casualties 
during the Korean War and felt that it deserved full membership.  Turkey’s 
role in the War was a deciding factor in its admission to NATO in terms of 
US sponsorship for its admission (Kirişci, 1998: 1). 
On February 16, 1952 Turkey was accepted as a full member of 
NATO, and even the new opposition (RPP) praised the government.  
Through Turkey’s entrance into NATO, the US was guaranteed an ally as 
well as the use of bases to preserve its military interests.  Turkey gained an 
ally, aid for its economy, and military support through its decision to join 
NATO.  The US would provide funding for the Turkish military as well as 
money for opening up military bases on Turkish soil.   
These bases helped strengthen the economy of the Western coast of 
Turkey by bringing in Americans to spend their dollars in the Turkish 
market.  In addition, businesses were set up by local entrepreneurs in order 
to cater to military personnel.  Jobs were created within NATO for Turkish 
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citizens who had the skills to meet its needs.  Overall, NATO helped 
stimulate the post-war economy of Turkey.  The elites’ efforts to formulate 
arguments to promote Turkey’s entrance into NATO paved the way for 
entry, which was viewed as a triumph by the masses, and celebrated by all.  
The governmental establishment worked to enhance the importance of 
Turkey’s inclusion into Western-based alliances. 
However, Turkey’s relations with the US did not progress in a 
completely positive manner.  For example, during the Cold War the Jupiter 
Missile Crisis raised issues of mistrust, resulting in the Turkish elite coming 
to the conclusion that the superpowers were making covert deals and 
compromising Turkish security (Kirisҫi: 1998, 2).  Since Turkey was under 
the impression that the missiles were installed to aid in their protection, 
when the US removed them without consulting with Turkish officials, this 
action promoted distrust of US intentions.   
Furthermore, the letter sent by President Lyndon B. Johnson to 
Prime Minister İsmet İnönü precipitated further turbulent relations 
between the two countries.  The letter warned Turkey not to use US 
weapons in Cyprus, which could potentially set off a Soviet retaliation, and 
not to expect the US to help Turkey defend herself against the Soviets.  
When Turkey did not heed these warnings, the US imposed arms supply 
sanctions against Turkey for invading Cyprus with troops.  Many points of 
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contention arise out of the Cyprus and Greece conflict.  Turkey is uncertain 
as to whom the US is really supporting.  Officially, the US is not able to 
publicly favor one side too much, considering the political repercussions 
this action would have on the home front.  
In recent years, Turkey has declared its support for Israel alongside 
the US, thus diverging from the interests of its Arab neighbors.  This action 
set Turkey apart from its neighbors, who already were resentful of 
Turkey’s leadership role in the region.  As a result, the Palestinian Labor 
Organization (PLO) and Syria had even more reason to provide funding to 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a terrorist organization wreaking 
havoc on Turkey’s domestic security situation (Brosnahan, 2004: 207).  The 
PKK receives its support from Turkey’s enemies; thus, increasing the 
amount of enemies greatly affects internal security.  With sanctions 
imposed on Iraq, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, trade went from a flood 
to a mere “trickle” (Grant, 2001: 1).  Hence, the Turkish economy suffered 
in trade with Iraq.  Given its strong support of the US, Turkey has often 
taken a risk in relations with its neighbors. 
In recent world political events, the region surrounding Turkey has 
changed considerably in a short period of time.  As a result, the relative 
importance of Turkey as a regional actor has increased over the last decade.  
US officials hope to benefit from these changed circumstances and develop 
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a stronger relationship through a deeper economic partnership (Larson, 
2003: 2).   
Some of these changes include: stability in the Balkans, enlargement 
of the EU, economic growth in the former Soviet Republics, reform and 
energy growth in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the potential for a more 
Westernized neighbor in Iraq, and expanding economic prospects in the 
Middle East (Larson, 2003: 2).  Significant headway, in recent years, has 
been made to transform Turkey’s role as a regional actor, which is 
important to examine regarding the changing nature of allied relations 
between the US and Turkey.  Turkey now better serves as a link between 
the superpower and the region surrounding Turkey’s borders.   
After the relative easing of tensions in the Balkans, Turkey will be 
able to start looking westward to help expand its regional economic role.  
Furthermore, improved relations with Greece will hopefully enhance 
economic ties for the long run.  Greece as a friendlier neighbor also means 
improved relations with Cyprus, as evidenced by the recent opening of the 
border between the Northern and the Southern zones of the island.   
Turkey joining the EU will also change the economic dynamic in 
Europe; even though Turkey already benefits from several agreements, 
becoming a full member will have a positive impact on Turkey’s economy.  
In addition, the US supports Turkey’s joining the EU because it will help 
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take some of the responsibility for helping Turkey restore its troubled 
economy.  Turkey’s membership may serve to strengthen the US position 
within the EU. 
As Russia, Ukraine, and some of the other former Soviet Republics 
increase their economic prowess Turkey may also be able to benefit 
commercially.  Major Turkish firms such as Koҫ and Sabancı have already 
benefited by the greater number of markets created by the opening up of 
Russia.  Likewise, Russian multi-national corporations (MNCs) stand to 
profit from establishing ties with Turkish firms and setting up their own 
investments in Turkey. 
In addition, if countries in the Caucuses and Central Asia become 
more active and expand their energy sectors, then Turkish businessmen 
can stand to profit by partnering with various firms.  Specifically, the 
Caucuses can stand to benefit from Turkey’s by serving as an outlet for its 
natural resource exports.  Also, the Asian market has become an important 
player in the Turkish economy, regarding the significant increase in the 
amount of imports from this region, of late. 
Next, if Iraq undergoes regime change and becomes more 
democratic, Turkey can also reap the advantages of Iraq’s new emerging 
markets.  Turkey has been a long standing trading partner with Iraq before, 
and to a lesser degree after, the Gulf War, and will continue to consider its 
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relatively neutral stance in the recent aggressions against Iraq by the US.  If 
the situation in the Middle East improves in general, Turkey could possibly 
become a regional leader and improve its financial state.   
Given the changing dynamics in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, 
and Asia, Turkey may become even more strategically important.   Also, if 
the US government continues to take a more active role in world politics by 
trying to turn the whole world into a democracy, Turkey will become more 
important for Americans as an example of a developing and progressive 
Muslim democratic country.  Furthermore, the potential leadership role of 
Turkey might be crucial in certain Middle Eastern countries, where the US 
may not be considered as trustworthy as Turkey. 
In recent years, the US has come to understand Turkey’s 
importance, offering more financial assistance in order to guarantee 
Turkey’s position as an ally.  However, as the US feels like it is in greater 
need of Turkey’s support, Turkey becomes emboldened and feels like it can 
do without the US.  Changes over time in the US-Turkey relationship have 
taken on a very different nature since they started out.  Turkey no longer 
feels completely dependent on the US, partly given its strengthening role 
as a regional actor and its potential EU membership.  When not seeking US 
backing, Turkey can strive for the approval of the Europeans.  However, in 
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order to eventually attain its foreign policy goals, Turkey cannot tilt too 
much towards either power. 
The US puts forth great efforts to preserve its relationship with 
Turkey partly due to its many personal interests.  These interests are based 
on military, natural resource, and investment concerns.  In a military sense, 
the US sees Turkey as a base camp for its access to the Middle East and the 
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), if necessary.   
It is essential to examine official statements presented to the US 
government on Turkey’s importance as an ally, in order to understand the 
reasons behind providing aid for the country.  The Department of Defense 
is particularly key in rallying for support in Congress for maintaining a 
strong friendship between the two countries, while preserving its military 
interests.  In a hearing before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East, a Department of Defense official related 
the importance of Turkey in a military strategic and security sense.  W. 
Bruce Weinrod (1991: 63) starts out with the classic statement that Turkey 
is a bridge between Europe and the Middle East.  Next, the strategic 
location in terms of sharing a common border with the USSR is stressed.  
Since Turkey has control of the Bosphorus straits, it has the ability to deny 
the Soviets access to their Black Sea Ports, which are the only non-frozen 
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ports during the winter.  Before the Cold War ended these were especially 
important components of Turkey’s strategic might, and still are to this day.  
Furthermore, Turkey’s role in the Gulf Crisis, as an important ally, is 
emphasized to distinguish it from other nations.  Weinrod (1991: 63) goes 
on to explain how Turkey cut off overland access from Iraq to Europe, 
putting an end to Iraq’s transit trade with Europe.  In addition, the pipeline 
Iraq was using to export half of its crude oil through Turkey was closed, 
encumbering Turkey with a loss of almost half a billion dollars per year 
(Weinrod, 64).  Exports to Iraq were stopped, which took away Turkey’s 
second largest export market creating a gap of ten percent.  Turkish troops 
were placed at the Northern border with Iraq, helping distract forces that 
instead might have been sent to the Kuwaiti border.  Also, İncirlik Air 
Force Base, in Adana was used by the US to attack Iraq during the Gulf 
War.  The US was able to use these bases and some other Turkish facilities 
because of the US-Turkish Defense Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(DECA). 
While the Department of Defense has many supporters lobbying in 
Congress on behalf of Turkey and securing aid, the Greek and Armenian 
lobbies also present a strong voice of opposition on aid to Turkey and its 
general role as an ally.  In particular, the American Hellenic Institute 
constantly sends its members to voice their support for Greece and 
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opposition for Turkey.  Dean C. Lomis (1991: 420) makes the argument that 
at best Turkey is a convenient ally.  Concerning the pipeline issue, Lomis 
points out that Turkey shut down the pipeline only after the Soviet Union 
joined the embargo against Iraq, and after Iraq itself reduced the flow of oil 
by 70 percent through that pipeline anyway.  Regarding the Turkish troops 
on Iraq’s northern border, he claims that the soldiers were already 
stationed there to fend off Kurdish rebels and did not contribute in a major 
way to the attack on Iraq (Lomis, 1991: 421).  Lomis states that “Turkey 
cannot be our policeman in the Middle East” (1991: 421).  He expands on 
his argument by pointing out that Turks are less likely to fight against their 
Muslim brothers and that, paradoxically, the Arabs do not like the Turks in 
general (Lomis, 1991: 421).  Lomis makes a valid argument, in some sense, 
which has been supported by the recent conflict in Iraq, where Turkey was 
hesitant to support the US.  Turkey has been a long-standing ally of the US, 
but it has not always been extremely predictable in its actions since the 
government is always changing and the tides of public opinion are 
frequently fluctuating.  In addition, Turkey is wedged between two powers 
(the EU and the US) and is always trying to satisfy one without offending 
the other. 
Turkey, including its neighbors, has access to natural resources such 
as energy and oil, which the US could potentially benefit from.  Anatolia 
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was singled out for chrome, antimony, emery meerschaum, lead, zinc, and 
other minerals (Burke: 1977, 92).  In regards to other minerals, boron, 
lignite, chromium ore, aluminum, copper, gold, and trona are mined in 
Turkey.   Sixty-three percent of the world’s boron reserve is located in 
Turkey while sixteen percent is located in the US; however, the true 
amounts are not readily published because of the strategic importance of 
the element (Kahriman and Özkan, 2001: 67-68).  Boron is used in the 
pharmaceutical industry in part as an antiseptic.  From a strategic 
standpoint, boron is used in hardened plastics in the automotive industry, 
industrial fiber production in fiber optic communication, fuel for space 
technology, production of glass materials that withstand heat, production 
of jet motors and jet plane fuel, nuclear energy powerhouses, hard steel 
production, and lasers in weaponry (Kahriman and Özkan: 70).   Eighty 
percent of the world’s boron resources are used by the US and Western 
European countries.  One of the reasons that larger amounts of Turkey’s 
natural resources are not extracted is the difficulty presented by the 
government and all the bureaucracy involved in obtaining permission.  In 
general, only a few large firms hold a monopoly over any given mineral or 
similar substance. 
Besides potential benefits from the mining of raw natural resources, 
the US also stands to gain from Turkey’s geographic location as an outlet 
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for the Caspian region’s export of natural resources.  Oil and gas coming 
from this region through Turkey by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is 
less of a “geopolitical risk” and “would secure Turkey's position in the 
regional hydrocarbon infrastructure and Turkey's own energy needs” 
(Grant, 2001: 2).  Relying too much on Russia or Iran for an outlet to this 
regions oil and gas could pose a greater political risk when compared to 
Turkey.  Another US advantage to obtaining oil from this region would 
mean less reliance on Arab countries.  The US is always willing to diversify 
its sources from which to obtain oil.  In addition, according to the official 
government position presented by former Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
the Bush administration supported the pipeline.  Additional US interests 
mentioned by Powell (2001: 83) in the Caspian region included,  
enhancing the independence and sovereignty of the states in 
this region; reestablishing economic linkages to increase 
cooperation and reduce regional conflict; bolstering global 
energy security to ensure that new sources of oil and gas 
reach world markets reliably; and creating business 
opportunities for U.S. companies. 
 
While the US does not solely entertain economic interests in the 
region, it is also concerned about the political and security aspect of 
regional equilibrium.  Powell (2001: 83) proceeds to mention that 
Turkey’s interest in the pipeline would be to expand its links to the 
Caucuses while reducing the potential increase in shipments of oil 
through the Bosphorus.  The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is currently one 
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of the biggest and most important projects in Turkey involving 
natural resources.   
FDI was expanding partly in order to reap the benefits from these 
resources until the recent economic crisis when flight of foreign capital 
reversed the flow.  Turkey had been listed under the top-10 emerging 
markets list up until that point.  Arguments supporting FDI in Turkey 
range from market potential, location, and reduced labor costs, to access to 
the EU, the Baltics, and Turkic Republics (Deichmann et al., 2003: 1768-
1769).  The majority of investment is dominated by service firms, followed 
by manufacturing, and lastly agriculture and mining (Deichmann, 1774).2  
The nature of this type of investment will remain relatively stable, 
narrowing the gap between services and manufacturing, but the number of 
firms will also increase steadily, as hoped over the years.  To help 
encourage FDI, laws have been reformed that consider the investor, as Ali 
Babacan (2004: 2) Turkey’s Minister of Economic Affairs points out that a 
minimum amount of funds is no longer required and rather than obtaining 
permission at the outset, a system of reviewing progress of investments has 
been developed.  These reforms reduce the bureaucratic hurdles that 
entrepreneurs must overcome in order to invest in Turkey, which should 
increase investment from the US.  As of 1995, the EU was the major 
                                            
2 As of 1995, the percentage breakdown is 70, 28, and 2, respectively.  In recent years, the 
gap between services and manufacturing has narrowed according to statistics. 
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investor in Turkey, followed by the US and Canada, Asian countries, the 
Middle East, and “transition states” (Deichmann, 1776).3  Hopefully, with 
the liberalization of investment laws, US investors will be encouraged to 
bring their business to Turkey.  However, according to the United Nation’s 
Inward FDI Performance Index, Turkey ranks number 123rd (Baykal, 2003: 
5).4  In the future, if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, this will certainly 
improve opportunities for FDI, especially on the part of the US.   
    
 
2.2 Europe as an Ally 
 
 Although Turkey lies at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, it 
is much more strongly integrated into the European realm.  Examining the 
depth and nature of EU-Turkey relations will help shed light on the nature 
of the relationship’s future and the possibilities for aid for Turkey.  Also, 
the nature of the relationship has changed with time as Europe became 
increasingly powerful and Turkey becomes regionally stronger without 
losing its intense desire to become a part of the EU.   
Briefly examining the nature of commerce is important in order to 
understand the subsequent agreements signed with the EC and 
                                            
3 The percentage breakdown is as follows: 67, 19, 11, 2, and 1. 
4 Turkey is below Bangladesh and just above Haiti in terms of FDI. 
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subsequently, the EU.  Almost half of Turkey’s trade is with Europe.  For 
example, in 1992, 51.7 percent of Turkish exports went to, and 43.9 percent 
of imports came from, the EU.  In 2000, this grew to 49 percent while 
exports fell slightly, to 50 percent.  Over the years, the nature of goods that 
Turkey exports to the EU has been diversified.  Until the early 1970s, 
Turkey mainly exported agricultural goods.  However, after diversification, 
manufactured goods started to be shipped, mostly textiles, but at the very 
least a greater degree of industrial exports were produced, when compared 
to agriculture.     
As an associate member of the European Community (EC), the 
Western European Union (WEU), the Council of Europe, and the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Turkey has 
been quite active in its endeavors to become a full member of the EU.  The 
elite of the country wanted to make sure that Turkey allied itself with the 
West in order to guarantee its “westernization.”  In addition, Turkey 
wanted to align itself with Europe for political, strategic, and economic 
reasons.  As joining the EU becomes an issue, cultural and religious 
concerns have come to the forefront. 
 After signing the Ankara Agreement of 1963, the EU and Turkey 
signed an Additional Protocol in 1972, which is the longest standing 
association relationship that the EU has been involved in.  Even though 
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Turkey is an associate member, this does not mean that it is guaranteed 
membership.  Rather, once Turkey has filled all the requirements that are 
deemed necessary by the Europeans, then another decision must be made 
as to whether the country can become a full member.  Beyond trade, the 
Ankara Agreement also includes free movement of workers, settlement 
rights for professionals, and harmonizing the tax system, rules of 
competition, and various other economic and legal regulations.  The 
Association Council, as the governing organization, is responsible for 
making sure that the stipulations of the agreement are implemented.   
It took until the early 1990s for a significant part of the Ankara 
Agreement and the Additional Protocol to actually be realized.  As part of 
these agreements, customs duties and non-tariff barriers for manufactured 
goods from Turkey were abolished by 1973.  However, textiles and 
clothing were regulated in a separate agreement referred to as voluntary 
self-restraint agreements set up by Turkish textile exporters and the EU 
authorities.   
In addition, Turkish agricultural goods were never completely 
aligned with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  Standards for 
pesticides and the use of genetic engineering on plants were just one 
example of what was not controlled in Turkey by the EU.  As a result, 
agricultural goods were subject to regulation by non-tariff barriers of the 
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CAP.  Effectively, the EU limited the most competitive products that 
Turkey could potentially export.   
The free movement of labor, another stipulation ignored by the EU, 
was initially sidestepped by Germany.  It first put a ban on recruiting 
workers from non-EC countries in 1973.  Next, visa requirements were 
implemented for those who wished to visit Europe from Turkey.  Those 
who wished to immigrate to Europe could only do so if they were joining a 
family member who was already there.  Later, it mostly became a bilateral 
issue between Turkey and Germany, as the EC proposed that all new 
workers be banned from entering Europe as the Association Agreement 
continued.  However, Turkey did not approve of this proposal.  When 
Germany first started to seek the limitation of Turkish workers, it was 
mainly because of economic and social concerns due to the influx of such a 
great deal of unskilled labor.  In recent years, one of the reasons Turkish 
workers were not desired was because of the rise of xenophobia and the 
fear of Islam becoming a significant element of European culture.  These 
xenophobic attitudes also contributed to the limitation of financial aid to 
Turkey.   
Another shortcoming of the Agreement was the failure of the EU to 
pass the fourth Financial Protocol of 1981, which would have given Turkey 
600 million ECUs (European Currency Unit).  The goal of this aid was to 
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ease the Turkish economy into the customs union and make up for the 
losses potentially experienced by industry.  Until that year, Turkey had 
received $705 million from three Financial Protocols.  However, the coup of 
1980 blocked the approval of the fourth financial protocol, which was 
subsequently blocked by Greece in later years due to the Greek-Turkish 
conflict.   
 When closely examining the record of efforts made to institute the 
stipulations of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol, it can 
be understood that Turkey did not make a wholehearted effort in 
implementing the provisions either.  Two tariff reductions, in the amount 
of ten percent, were made in 1973 and 1976 for goods coming from the EC.  
Also, adjusting to the common external tariffs put forth by the EC, and 
reducing quantitative restrictions on imported EC goods, was started but 
never carried out.  Turkey was most interested in concessions for the 
export of agricultural goods to Europe, but it had not made headway in 
adapting to conditions of the CAP.   
Some elements of the ruling elite became critical of the customs 
union, in 1995 and were wary of liberalizing trade, and instead favored 
state planned national economic development through import substitution.  
Turkey hoped that by liberalizing trade with Europe, its economy would 
show positive developments, but failed to realize that the economy had to 
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develop in other ways besides solely relaxing barriers to trade.  The 
Turkish argument started to move in the direction of discouraging 
liberalization of trade with Europe, because it believed that Europe was 
benefiting at its expense.  Even though there was no hard evidence that this 
was the case, Turkey used this as a strong political argument against 
opening up its borders for trade (Kramer, 1996: 208).   
In addition, Turks were offended by constant European criticism of 
Turkish democracy and its human rights record.  Greece’s constant 
antagonism towards Turkey also made the ruling elite negative toward 
Brussels, because they believed that more should be done to check Greece.  
Most of Turkey’s relations with Europe, in recent years, have been based 
on Turkey’s eventual or potential entrance into the EU.  Turkey’s 
relationship with the EU has had its ups and downs, for example, in the 
Luxembourg and Helsinki Agreements.5  However, in general relations 
have been favorable in recent years. 
 When supplying aid, EU interests in Turkey have from US interests.  
Most of the aid provided to Turkey is allocated for the purpose of 
promoting eventual accession.  In terms of conditionality, specific changes 
made to infrastructure should be in alignment with EU standards.  The EU 
also stands to benefit from improvements made in Turkey with the help of 
                                            
5 In the Luxembourg Summit (December 1997) Turkey was not accepted as a candidate 
country but in the Helsinki Summit (December 1999) this decision was reversed. 
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their aid.  According to a Commission proposal (2001: 3) projects that 
might receive funding include the  
improvement of infrastructures, the promotion of 
environmental protection and agriculture and rural 
development, the stimulation of energy transport networks 
and the alleviation of administrative and institutional 
obstacles between border regions…[and] the creation of 
networks and links on either side of the border. 
 
These conditions placed on aid disbursement tend to benefit both the EU 
and Turkey.  
The EU would like to see Turkey enhance institution-building, 
investment support, and civil society expansion.  Institutions will be built 
by technical assistance and training.  Investment support would include 
mainly supplies for projects.  Any endeavors that would support the 
Copenhagen criterion through information, education, and training 
especially the development of Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
pertaining to women’s concerns would receive funding.  Most of the aid 
provided to Turkey will help develop the country and potentially lessen 
the burden, which a project will heap on the EU if Turkey joins.   
There are many positive arguments as to why the EU should be 
interested in Turkey, or what Turkey has to offer the EU.  Some argue that 
with Turkey’s accession into the EU, Europe stands to benefit from Turkey 
in a security sense.  For example, Sadi Ergüvenҫ (2001: 74), a retired Air 
Force general, points out that with Turkey joining the EU there is a greater 
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chance that war will not occur between them, essentially creating stability.  
In addition, by Turkey reducing its chance of being a security threat, the 
general security of Europe will increase.  He goes on to stress that Turkey 
will be able to play a greater role in ensuring security in the Balkans if it 
were to become a member (2001: 74).  Another important issue is the access 
that the EU would be provided to Turkey’s large standing army.  Although 
the Europeans may not wish to benefit from Turkey’s armed forces as 
much as the US, since both follow very different foreign policies, it may 
become a greater concern in the future. 
By becoming an EU member, Turkey opens up the possibility for 
Europe to glean advantages from Near Eastern and Middle Eastern 
projects for natural resources.  Since Turkey is considered a regional power 
when stretching eastward, the EU can stand to benefit from this leadership 
role.  The Retired External Relations Commissioner of the EU, Christopher 
Patten (2002: 1) believes that Turkey is an example for other Muslim 
countries.  He points out that,  
Look at what we demand of them and other countries: 
democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights.  Now 
that Turkey is in the process of carrying out enormous and 
fundamental reforms, can we afford to suddenly tell them 
that, however much they do, we are still not prepared to 
accept them (2002: 1)? 
 
 Given the importance of Middle East stability, Patten sees that it is crucial 
for Turkey to be a model for other Islamic countries.  Given this strong role 
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that Turkey possesses in the Middle East, acquiring natural resources from 
its neighbors would be a great benefit for the EU.  Much of the natural 
resources and energy that the US stands to benefit from is also available to 
the EU, which has even greater advantages due to its geographic proximity 
to Turkey.  
Foreign direct investment in Turkey, as of 1995, is about 67 percent 
EU dominated; Germany, France, and the Netherlands being the top 
investors (Deichmann et al., 1776).  In addition, most Turkish firms that 
have connections abroad are usually tied to Europe, and a majority of 
Turks who live abroad reside in Europe.  The majority of European MNCs 
that invest in Turkey are service-oriented; however, with manufacturing 
expanding, the nature of investment will be changing in the future.  In 
addition, Europeans investing in an emerging market stand to make good 
profits over trying to expand their companies in markets that are relatively 
saturated.  As far as geography within Turkey, Europeans tend to look for 
“market strength and sea access” more so than other countries when 
investing in a particular region of Turkey (Deichmann, 1776).  This is one of 
the reasons why Eastern Turkey gets hardly any investment when 
compared to the western port. 
 The changes over time in Turkey’s relationship with Europe have 
exhibited strengthening ties.  When Europe once feared the onslaught of 
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the Ottoman Empire on its territory, it is now in the process of welcoming 
its successor into its camp.  Only time will tell how much Turkey increases 
its ties with or dependence on Europe.  Strengthening relations with the EU 
will reduce its need for strong relations with the US, while the US hopes 
that Turkey may serve as a link to greater support within the EU. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
AID PACKAGES FROM THE US, EU, AND IFIS 
 
 
The majority of aid provided to Turkey, over the years, has been by 
the US and Europe.  However, when at odds with these superpowers, 
Turkey turned to the USSR for assistance.  This action in the post-WWII 
period and during the Cold War awoke fear in the minds of Americans and 
Europeans who felt propelled to aid Turkey to keep the country from 
turning Communist.  However, the relatively steady flow of assistance 
from the US and EU is more relevant to examine in terms of impacting the 
Turkish economy and creating dependency towards the West.  In addition, 
the US and certain European countries are major components of IFIs such 
as the World Bank, IMF, and OECD.  
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3.1 Aid from the United States to Turkey 
 
In general, the US provides a large dollar amount of foreign aid to 
many countries, but not in terms of percentage of the US budget.  This is 
mainly because of the weak backing for foreign aid in public opinion, 
which discourages congressional support.  For example, Congressmen 
would not want to be linked with doling out large sums of aid, which 
taxpayers may view as a waste of the scarce budgetary resources.  In 
addition, the strength of the Armenian and Greek lobby is much greater 
than the Turkish lobby in the US Congress.  Armenians and Greeks mainly 
point to the so-called “Armenian Genocide” and the Cyprus problem 
respectively, as reasons for why Turkey should not receive more aid.  
Furthermore, the Greek lobby also stresses the Aegean problem, whereby 
Turkey and Greece cannot agree on the nature and scope of the limits and 
extensions of territorial waters, as a reason to limit aid.  In addition, these 
lobbies claim that Turkey uses weapons bought from the US against 
Kurdish separatists in Eastern Turkey.  Certain members of the US 
Congress tend to support these arguments partly because Turkey is a 
Muslim country and Greece and Armenia are Christian countries.  
Congress, and the US public, is still generally conservative and religious 
when compared to other counterparts in the Western world. 
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Turkey first applied for aid from the US in 1946.  Towards the fall of 
the Empire and the beginning of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, 
foreign domination of economic growth and sovereignty had left a bad 
impression of monetary assistance from foreign countries.  However, based 
on their experiences with US involvement in the past through missionaries, 
Turkey was positive about a relationship that might be pursued in the 
future.   
The US first started supplying aid to Turkey because of the fear that 
Turkey might ally with the Russians and turn communist.  The early terms 
of conditionality for economic assistance were based on US fears that 
Turkey may turn communist.  Furthermore, the Russians had already 
revealed their designs on Turkish territories.  According to Waldo Drake, 
the Times European Correspondent of the era, the Turks had merely 
“stretched an antisubmarine net across the narrow strait” of the Bosphorus 
in order to ‘catch vagrant mines’ (Drake: 1950, 6).  Drake saw this as a weak 
attempt, due to lack of resources, to combat the Russian threat.  He argues 
that if the US supplied more aid to Turkey, then the Turks would be able to 
more effectively defeat the Russians.  In March of 1945, Russia wanted the 
Montreux Convention to be altered to allow it to jointly control the straits 
with Turkey.  When the US, Great Britain, and Turkey rejected this idea the 
Soviets started making demands on territories in Eastern Turkey namely 
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Kars and Ardahan (Vandenberg, Senate Report: 1948, 757).  Fear of the 
Russian threat grew as countries in Eastern Europe such as Hungary and 
Romania fell to the Communists.   
There is also a great deal of apprehension about the Greek reaction 
to Communism.  Secretary of State George C. Marshall argued in 1948 that 
Turkey was in a better economic position than Greece to fend off the 
Russians, but was still in need of additional funds in order to guarantee 
their allegiance to the West (Marshall, 1948: 383).  Marshall also points out 
that Turkey needed to keep its military strong in order to prevent the 
Russian army from stationing troops in Turkey or trying to take over the 
Bosphorus.  However, in order to maintain a strong active army, Marshall 
emphasizes that Turkey needed to receive aid from the US.  At the time, 
sums of between $100 million and $275 million were provided for military 
supplies.  The Act that provided aid to Greece and Turkey allocated $400 
million to the two countries.  In 1948, Turkey received $100 million that 
was allocated for the military, including $48.5 million for the ground 
forces, $26.75 million for the air force, $14.75 million for the navy, $5 
million for arsenal improvement, and $5 million for highway 
improvements (Senate Report, 1948: 759).  The Marshall Plan in its first 
year provided $10 million in credits for agricultural development.  
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Additional aid was provided to improve the import and export market as 
well as agriculture.         
 In the early stages of aid (1946-1969), Turkey received $2,637.2 
million in economic assistance from the US (Burke, 152).  Six short years 
later this amount had only increased by approximately $70 million.  The 
assistance was about evenly divided between grants and loans.  Most of the 
aid was provided for the military, agriculture, and mechanization of 
industry.  In the early 1970s, agriculture accounted for approximately 27 
percent of GNP, while half the working population was in the agricultural 
sector.  Initially most of the money allocated for agriculture was used to 
purchase tractors.  For example, from 1948 to 1952, the number of tractors 
increased from less than 2,000 to over 31,000 (Burke, 154).  Along with 
tractors, funding was supplied for other agricultural equipment such as 
plows, reapers, and trailers. 
However, the drought of the mid-1950s decreased the emphasis on 
mechanization of agriculture and increased the emphasis on improving the 
quality of the land.  Thus, technical assistance was made a priority in order 
to train farmers in the knowledge they needed to increase yield from their 
crops.  Extension services were set up for farmers to contact each other and 
learn from one another’s mistakes.  For example, clubs were set up to help 
farmers keep in touch, information centers were established, agricultural 
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advisors were hired, and a university was set up all in the name of 
agricultural education.   
The most successful component of these projects was the founding 
of Atatürk University in Erzurum.  Although the University had problems 
with its faculty, through conflicts with the American staff from the 
University of Nebraska, it was eventually able to hire dynamic professors 
to pursue the original goals of the university to establish the foremost 
institution of higher agricultural education in Turkey.  The University 
slowly started to expand with the establishment of youth groups, in-service 
training programs, preparation of informational material, a growing home 
economics unit, and technical training.  On the downside, Americans noted 
that not enough attention was paid to long-range planning, administration, 
and organization even though it was obviously necessary.  The other 
educational programs that created problems mainly conflicted with the 
interests of the locals and the leadership.  As a result, farmers carried on 
with traditional methods and did not benefit from the new techniques they 
could otherwise have learned in the program. 
 Water management was another project that was given importance 
to under support for agriculture.  Three major advancements were made: 
founding of Topraksu which is similar to the US Conservation Corps, the 
establishment of the department of land and water resources development 
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(Devlet Su İşleri – DSİ), and education of farmers on soil and water 
conservation.  Land leveling and irrigation practices were carried out in 
order to meet new standards.  By the time funding for these projects ended 
in 1968, they were already up and running strong.   
The Topraksu project had set up twenty-two camps to train young 
farmers in soil and water irrigation practices.  When the World Food 
Program took over funding of this project in 1965, it had set up eighty-four 
camps with a total of twenty farmers at each camp.  Through the training 
of these camps, farmers ended up irrigating approximately 1.11 million 
acres by 1967, and spent time conducting valuable research on soil 
conservation and irrigation planning.  By the end of the program, thirty-
eight American technicians had spent about a total of sixty years in Turkey. 
The DSİ was established in 1953, with the responsibilities of flood 
control and water development for hydroelectric power and agriculture.  
Water resources became so highly developed by 1970 that 250,000 acres 
could be irrigated each year.  Training of personnel was an important 
component of the DSİ henceforth; thirty-eight US advisors spent a total of 
seventy-seven years in Turkey.  The effective training and strong 
leadership ensured the success of these programs, and ensures that the DSİ 
continues to plan water works for Turkey today.  Turkey is fortunate 
compared to other Middle Eastern countries, where the US was not able to 
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contribute as much funding to water management.  As a result, Turkey has 
a strong infrastructure for irrigation and is able to apply new technologies 
to its crops at reasonable prices.  In many Arab countries where water is a 
scarce commodity in comparison to Turkey, advanced irrigation techniques 
are not widely used or known about, partly due to high costs. 
Certain failures were also demonstrated with the water-control 
irrigation component of assistance to agriculture.  Administrative problems 
occurred with Topraksu and DSİ not being a part of the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  Topraksu was originally under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
but later joined the Ministry of Village Affairs, while DSİ was under the 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.  Since the two foundations were 
under two different groups, coordination became more difficult.  Field 
workers were able to cooperate once decisions from above were handed 
down, but oftentimes decisions had to be made at the central government 
level by the Ministry of Agriculture, thus making communication between 
the different levels of government difficult.   
 The Topraksu project was another venture that was not as successful 
as planned.  It did not function at the local level or at the national and 
regional level.  A 1969 evaluation stated that more attention should be 
given to the farmer (Burke, 173).  The US did not realize the potential that 
existed for irrigation while its personnel participated in an on-farm water 
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development project that was designed to work in two phases.  The first 
phase of the project was to set up a demonstration project near İzmir and 
then extend it to other areas.  The project got off to a shaky start because a 
workforce was hard to find and Topraksu refused to begin until everything 
was set up and ready to operate.  Private-sector resources were used, 
specifically land development equipment, but were hard to mobilize.  
Topraksu technicians and farmers ended up working together to irrigate 
approximately 1,600 acres.  Almost half of Topraksu’s budget was spent 
upon on-farm water development.  The Turkish government did not 
support the farmer cost-sharing prerequisites and the private sector 
funding for equipment.  By 1972, the Office of the Auditor General 
recommended the termination of the project; however, US funding 
continued for another three years. 
The main problem with these projects was mostly at the highest 
levels of administration and management.  For example, necessary support 
was not received from the Turkish side for funding and personnel.  
Different values and approaches between the two cultures could not be 
reconciled.  To address some of these problems, an Agricultural 
Administration and Planning Project was set up in 1971.  Research projects 
were planned for US advisors in the Project along with seminars involving 
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upper-management level officials from agriculture-related ministries and 
agencies.6   
Another agricultural program that was introduced with the help of 
US aid was the Mexican wheat project.  Bahri Dağdaş, after a period of 
research on the Mexican seeds, the minister of agriculture of the time 
encouraged their use in western and southwestern Turkey.  Preparations 
were made for the new seed to be planted in the fall of 1967.  Committees 
were arranged to help with the work as well as financial backing for the 
seed, fertilizer, credit, equipment, and transport.  Turkey purchased twenty 
tons of seed that were distributed between March and the time for 
planting.  In addition, educational endeavors were undertaken since 
farmers had to learn to cultivate using new procedures.  Even though 
weather conditions were not optimal, crop yields almost tripled as 
compared to previously used varieties of wheat.  Given the success of this 
project, it was decided that in the next growing season it would be 
introduced nationwide.  Farmers were able to produce one million more 
tons in 1969 than in 1968.  US aid programs provided $1.56 million in 
technical assistance and $700,000 in a supporting grant in 1968 (Burke, 167).  
The minister of agriculture’s speedy mobilization of capital in order to 
encourage planting of the new variety of wheat was unusual for Turkish 
                                            
6 Funding was provided for another four years for the project. 
 45
bureaucrats, who usually procrastinated when making changes.  Dağdaş 
even received important comments from researchers and those who 
wanted to see Turkish seeds developed and used.   
In general, the farmers participating in this project were not 
subsistence farmers, as US observers stressed, but were already small 
farmers who had the resources to purchase the seed and the necessary 
fertilizer.  Subsistence farmers were still not being given the attention 
necessary to improve their economic situation.  As the Mexican wheat was 
distributed throughout Anatolia, soil differences, smaller farms, and 
greatly uneducated farmers introduced problems.  Poor weather conditions 
and the lack of educational programs to spread the knowledge necessary in 
using new products, along with fertilizers, created problems for wheat 
production.  Supporters of the traditional Turkish seed felt their resistance 
to be justified since they had been against the new crop to begin with.  If 
the introduction of this new variety of wheat had been more carefully 
researched and implemented, then it may have been more successful from 
the beginning of the project.  However, since this crop was introduced into 
the most advanced parts of Turkey first, the other more backwards regions 
were not able to adapt.  Thus, farmers returned to their old routine once 
this project was deemed unsuccessful. 
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Since there were certain exceptions with the Mexican wheat project, 
the Minister of Agriculture became involved to speed it along to 
completion.  The administrative aspect of certain projects suffered, in 
general, because of the amount of bureaucracy that was involved.  Most 
Americans were placed in middle-level management positions or sent out 
in the field, so support from above was limited.  As a result, some projects 
were delayed because high-level decisions had to be made in Ankara, staff 
was limited, new people were assigned at a slow rate, and transportation 
could not be easily attained (Burke, 178).   
The productive aspects of the project did help advance Turkey in its 
agricultural sector.  Almost 2,000 Turks received agricultural training and 
education in the US, while Americans were able to pass on their knowledge 
and learn from those whom they were teaching.  Specifically, cereal grain 
production increased, along with cotton production, fruit and nut 
production, and the use of fertilizers.  Furthermore, irrigation and the use 
of training camps has helped improve the ability of farmers to learn how to 
use the land properly and receive the training they need.  As a result of the 
projects, Turkish and American cooperation grew to reach levels that had 
never been attained before.  Even if each project did not attain its planned 
goal headway was made in progressing towards advancement giving 
farmers in Turkey the “tools” to make progress on their own.  With US 
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influence, Turkish farmers would be able to take more initiative and make 
changes to progress towards greater levels of productivity. 
Aid to the agricultural sector from the US helps define US-Turkish 
relations in microcosm and relative amounts of dependency on the US for 
support.  The introduction of tractors was launched in regions of 
commercial farming such as Ҫukurova where levels of support were high.  
Tractors in the cotton fields increased productivity, thus reducing per unit 
cost, allowing farmers to prosper given the high level of world demand for 
cotton.  Furthermore, tractors were seen as a means for modernization 
since they could be used for transportation into towns from the village.  
Also, the use of machines was introduced to the villager, which was seen as 
advancement by the Turkish government.  However, all new innovations 
have their consequences.   
Mechanization of agriculture created problems with maintenance 
and unemployment.  Most farmers already lacked knowledge of 
mechanical skills.  Incompetent use, inability to maintain and repair, and a 
scarcity of spare parts all created problems with the introduction of tractors 
into the villages and towns.  Furthermore, the brands of most of the 
tractors varied, creating even more problems.  Nonetheless, as education 
became more widespread, along with the experience that time brought, the 
villagers were able to adapt to the new technology.   
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Mechanization also had an adverse effect on the structure of village 
life.  Originally, where land ownership was equally distributed and 
organized, people were in the same basic family unit, and levels of 
unemployment rose, were the groups that benefited most from the new 
changes (Burke, 169).  However, where the land was not equally 
distributed, fragmented, families were competing with each other; were the 
groups that not everyone was able to benefit from the changes (Burke, 169).  
Hired farm workers took the place of sharecroppers who did not benefit 
from increased productivity.  Some villagers became destitute if they 
happened to live in a region where the land was owned by a few rich 
families.   
Unemployment in the countryside led to urban migration, which 
created even more problems for the Turkish economy.  When villagers felt 
like they were forced to move to the city to find work, they often were not 
able to find housing and had to resort to substandard housing on the 
outskirts of the cities.  This created slums in the surrounding environs of 
the cities, thus having an adverse effect on the economy of Western Turkey. 
Small landowners fell further behind, while those who had capital 
and land were able to purchase tractors.  However, more capital, fertilizer, 
seed types, marketing, and land improvement technology became available 
to those with the resources to turn them into immediate productivity gains 
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(Burke, 170).  Small farmers, those owning less than five acres, did not 
benefit from these changes and did not contribute to making 
improvements.    
 The Extension Service set up to improve agriculture was in some 
ways a success, but was generally seen as a failure by many.  Problems of 
“priority, administration, and organization” were the main issues that 
inhibited the proper functioning of the joint project (Burke, 172).  Turkish 
interactions with Americans did not immediately solve the long-standing 
problems with the agricultural system.  Advisors sent from the US were 
usually proficient and concerned technicians willing to pass on their 
knowledge.  However, they were unable to modify the Turkish structures 
in order to make them more compatible with US procedures.  Americans 
tended to ignore the existing structure and carried out things in their own 
way, which would make the formation of a system coordinating Turkish 
values and US knowledge together almost impossible.   
It was realized too late that American technology needed to be 
adapted in many ways to address the desires of farmers in developing 
countries.  This does not necessarily mean that the equipment or procedure 
should be modified, but the method of introduction should have been 
adapted to local culture.  US policymakers believed that Americans 
working together with Turkish farmers and showing them how to use the 
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new technologies would be a proper solution.  However, this was not 
always the case, since many traditional farmers, especially in Eastern 
villages, were oftentimes not open to change.  They had been performing a 
task a certain way for hundreds of years, and did not appreciate foreigners 
dictating their practices.   
 The effectiveness of US aid to agriculture is influenced by several 
factors in assistance.  In the early years of the foundation of the Republic a 
real emphasis was put on industrialization.  Industrialization was a 
concrete expression of the goals of Westernization and modernization and 
still takes priority over economic goals.  As a result, agriculture has taken 
on a less important role than industrialization.  Investments made showed 
the greatest amount in housing, then manufacturing, and lastly agriculture 
(Burke, 175).  Industrialization is seen as an important goal because 
without it, Turkey would consider itself inferior to other countries (Burke, 
175).  The Turks realize that states with agricultural economies become 
highly dependent on other countries as opposed to those who are 
industrialized and can provide for themselves.  They feared they would 
become dependent like the Ottoman Empire had been in its final years, so 
they did not want to make agriculture the main sector in the economy. 
Making agriculture of second-rate importance is a difficult task since 
there are approximately 60,000 rural communities in the country.  Until 
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recently, many of the small settlements were isolated from large roads, 
adding to the likelihood that the community would remain agricultural.  
Furthermore, education to encourage advancement is lacking in many of 
these smaller communities.  Those in power or the elite feel they are the 
future of Turkey and that the villagers’ problems and desires are not 
important except during election campaigns.  Very little has been done to 
improve or change the living conditions in the village.  Various parties over 
the years have appealed to the lower classes in order to gain votes but it 
has mostly been for their own vested interests.   
US advisors as well as others tried to persuade the Turks that more 
of a focus should be placed on agriculture given certain statistics.  In the 
period from the 1960s to the 1970s, 60 percent of the people lived in rural 
areas while 66 percent of laborers were farmers (Burke, 176).  According to 
outside observers, more attention should have been given to agriculture to 
expand markets in specialty crops, such as fruits; improve chances for 
industrial development, and to address the needs of an unskilled labor 
force, and the unemployed (Burke, 176).  In addition, most of Turkey’s 
exports came from agriculture, specifically; cotton, fruits, and vegetables.   
However, the Turkish vision of the targeted goals for aid were 
different from the recommendations.  The aid was welcomed but not 
specifically used in the intended way.  For example, aid provided for 
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expanding the fruit or forest products industry was not used specifically 
for that purpose and not as efficiently as expected.  This is just one example 
of the conditions put on a loan that were not fulfilled.  Given that the 
conditions were very specific, local intentions for expenditures lay 
elsewhere.  In addition, credits for small farmers were established, but 
since the money was spent otherwise, not much was left over for its 
original purpose.  As a result, agriculture’s full potential was not realized.  
After many project evaluations, Americans came to the conclusion that 
levels of success were lower than anticipated.  Furthermore, administrative 
and managerial troubles created problems for the proper disbursement of 
aid.  Certain goals were reached in some projects, but a recurring problem 
was cooperation that required interagency linkages or local decision 
making.   
Another target for US aid was renovating the existing road system.  
Comparatively, this project worked more effectively than most others.  The 
amount of roadways in kilometers more than tripled within twenty years 
after the project started in 1948.  At the outset of the project, the US goal 
was to improve a few major roads in order to facilitate the needs of the 
military.  However, the head of the Turkish military pressed for a more 
elaborate restoration plan arguing that total mobilization and economic 
development were necessary.   
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A US plan was introduced under the direction of the US Bureau of 
Public Roads to provide aid for the construction program that was in place, 
and establish a Turkish highway department, which would carry on 
projects and train personnel.  The US invested about seventy million in a 
combination of grants and loans, while the Turks invested more than twice 
that amount.  The loans provided by the US were intended for equipment 
and consultation.  Along with improving the roads, establishing a 
Highway Directorate which included management practices not found in 
other agencies was a major achievement of the aid.  The success of the 
project was directly linked to strong support from the Turkish government, 
which meant that things were achieved at a faster pace.  In addition, the 
public supported this project, which ensured continuous funding from the 
government, while US support existed at every level and was supposed to 
be present for nine years.   
On-the-job training was provided for personnel or in the US at a 
more advanced and long-term level.  Accomplishments made at the 
operations level were linked to Western management and organizational 
skills.  Although a great deal of money was not invested in the highway 
program, it turned out to be the most successful.  Parts of rural Turkey 
were given access to the main roads to allow goods to move in and out of 
rural areas; consequently, politicians were able to appeal to their 
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constituencies and farmers were better able to reach their markets.  
Education was improved by facilitating the ease of delivery of newspapers 
and various publications into the village.  In addition, villagers were able 
to experience urban life and schooling became more widely accepted.  The 
labor force that participated in the project became more skilled as a result 
of on-the-job training, thereby demonstrating its importance.  Skilled 
workers and mid-level technicians were also in demand.  The highway 
project was one of the few projects that was widely supported by both US, 
Turkish officials, and leaders alike.   
Around the same time as the roadway project, plans were made to 
upgrade the rail system.  There were already 7,671 kilometers of railroads 
in 1950, when the decision was made to upgrade the tracks and equipment 
used.  In addition, maintenance procedures were improved.  US 
transportation and communication grants, in addition to commodity and 
defense grants, helped support the effort to rebuild the railroad.  A line 
was extended from Turkey to Iran as part of the Central Trade 
Organization (CENTO) with $7.5 million of US aid.  An extra $18.3 million 
was targeted from Support Assistance funds since it was considered a 
defense need.  Use of trains in general had increased for passengers and 
cargo; however, the trains did not get as much traffic as the roads.  The rail 
system ran at a loss due to pricing and problems with operation and the 
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use of outdated equipment.  Even though railroads span the entire country, 
they have not significantly increased the amount of traffic between the 
villages and the city centers as much as the roadway project has.  This was 
caused by the economic barriers created by the pricing of tickets and track 
distance from the villages. 
A great deal of the aid provided for Turkey was invested in industry 
in order to expand this sector.  Energy, iron, and steel have received the 
main chunk of support from the Turkish government and from donors 
abroad.  Project loans from 1958 to the mid 1970s consisted of 
approximately $500 million, of which around $350 million was targeted for 
energy and the development of heavy industry.  Additional funding was 
granted for studies to gauge the relative effectiveness of support. 
 More specifically, in the energy sector the US, for example, helped 
assist the development of the Zonguldak coal mines.  These mines, which 
may last for up to one hundred years, provide coal for the railways and the 
metallurgical industry, and generate electricity.  However, complications 
were presented because extracting the coal was difficult and expensive.  
The US invested over $69 million along with $130 million from the Turkish 
government in order to update equipment, technology, labor skills, and 
transportation facilities.  These changes were made in the hopes that the 
productivity of the mines and ease of operation would be improved.  In a 
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period of thirty years, coal production increased from around 1 million 
tons per annum to nearly 7.9 million tons.   
 Turkey’s electrical generating capacity increased from 305 MW in 
1948 to 2,342 MW by 1970.  Improvements in hydroelectric power 
accounted for this increase.  Furthermore, electrical transmission and 
distribution systems have been built to fill the demand for electricity in 
most of western and central Turkey. 
 The US started providing aid to the energy sector in the mid-1950s 
under defense support packages.  In 1956, $6 million in aid was provided, 
along with loans in 1965 of $5.7 and $2.4 million for power distribution.  A 
study was carried out in 1963, costing $300,000, on a hydroelectric power 
dam and plant construction.  Various loans and grants were provided to 
make improvements on power plants across the country.  For example, a 
$12.3 million loan in addition to $40 million in technical assistance was 
extended to expand a thermal power plant in Anbarlı near Istanbul.  Most 
of the power produced has been used by industry.  Cities have electricity 
for commercial, domestic, and civic use, including street lighting; however 
many villages lack such benefits.  By the early 1970s, according to the 
World Bank, only thirty nine percent of villages had access to electricity.   
 Another major outlet for US aid is the iron and steel industry.  For 
example, the Karabük iron and steel mills received enough aid to increase 
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their productivity from hundreds of thousands of tons to over a million 
tons in about twenty years.  US loans totaled around $196 million to 
expand the Ereğli steel mill complex close to the Black Sea.   
 The Ereğli mill is unique in Turkey for being an outlet for foreign 
and domestic investment.  Various US companies including Koppers 
Company, Blaw-Knox Company, and Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
own 25 percent of the stock.  Turkish investors include the Ankara 
Chamber of Commerce, Turkiye İş Bankası, and the government, which is 
represented by Sümer Bank.  The presence of private investors is a positive 
move in the direction of helping Turkish industry in its goals to privatize.  
A public and private sector has existed since the early years of the 
Republic, but there has been more of an emphasis on the public as opposed 
to the private. 
 Investments in the energy, steel, and coal sector were different from 
investments made in agriculture in several ways.  For example, 
investments were made on a grander scale and mainly targeted, the 
construction and equipment sectors.  In addition, the impact of aid in these 
sectors spread differently throughout society.  Except for personnel hired 
to work onsite or those living in the vicinity, there was no large impact on 
the lives of the majority of the people.  The products coming out of these 
facilities were mainly used to produce other goods.  For example, greater 
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amounts of coal production meant greater amounts of electricity to be used 
by industry.  In turn, an increase in iron and steel production meant a 
greater amount of raw materials for other industries.  More goods were 
produced as a result, decreasing the number of imports, but mainly 
shifting the source of goods. 
 These heavy industries required more monetary investment than 
labor.  As a result, jobs were created but employment rates were not 
significantly increased.  In Ereğli, modern technology of the times was used 
to transport iron ore to mills in order to stay competitive.  However, the 
lack of skilled workers posed another problem mainly because of the great 
deal of farm workers who apply for industry jobs.  Their low level of skills 
have impeded construction as well as slowed down operations.  Technical 
assistance has helped meet some of the needs to train workers.  In addition, 
plans to increase the amount of skilled workers through education and on-
the-job training helped industry.  Significant advances have been made but 
it is still considered a problem that needs to be solved. 
 Aid to industry compared to agriculture, differed with respect to the 
nature of US involvement.  US officials were consulted in planning 
projects, studies were supported by the US, and funding requests changed 
certain plans in order to increase efficiency (Burke, 186).  After the projects 
were started there was a greater deal of independence on the part of 
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Turkish personnel maintaining the project.  Outside contractors, who 
reported back to US officials, were hired to do a majority of the work.  The 
Turkish government mainly complained about administration problems 
and lack of skilled workers.  Since these contractors were hired directly to 
solve project problems they were more effective in concluding dam or mill 
projects.   
 The high-tech nature of the work meant changes in management 
style.  In the DSİ for example, dam and hydroelectric installation involved 
conflicts between objectives and modern management policies.  As a result, 
it was run under Western management techniques due to a great deal of 
US technical assistance.  However, the Zonguldak coal mines and Karabük 
iron and steel mills face certain problems because they are state-owned 
industries and managed by traditional bureaucracies.  US officials might 
recommend reductions in the number of personnel in the Ereğli iron and 
steel works plant.   
 Aid to change infrastructure has a major impact on a nation state.  
The goals, values, and expectations of receiver and giver differ.  Unlike aid 
to agriculture, assistance to industry is more specific.  Increases in 
productivity can be predicted beforehand and problems can be dealt with 
more readily.  Since the labor force needs to be highly skilled it is easier to 
train personnel because there is no need to rely on traditional customs and 
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work habits.  Furthermore, workers with special skills can be hired from off 
site.  A project that is proposed could have problems but when completed 
the installation of an industrial plant is inevitable.  Even if productivity is 
not as high as expected the plant can continue to operate.  As a result, 
success is usually more likely on the part of both the donor and recipient of 
assistance. 
 Some examples of aid allocated to specific projects in industry 
included coal, Black Sea copper, and Ereğli steel.  The Turkish coal 
industry was given $28.1 million in March of 1970 for helping modernize 
coal production facilities (House Hearing, 1971: 654).  There were two 
stages to the project; one involved expanding lignite mines which was on 
target, whereas the other project in Zonguldak was experiencing delays in 
procuring funding.  The Black Sea copper project was provided $30.5 
million even before it was fully implemented, since the government was 
seeking financing from the private sector (House Hearing: 1971, 654).  
However, only 16 percent of the funds were disbursed as compared to the 
82 percent of the total amount that was committed.  The Ereğli steel 
expansion project was promised $14.2 million, approximately $8 million 
less than what was originally intended, due to the fact that the nature of 
the steel products being produced changed (House Hearing: 1971, 655). 
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 The social and political impact of aid from the US has positive and 
negative aspects.  Furthermore, the aid provided to Turkey created 
dependence on foreign financing for industry and agriculture.  The 
changes provided by increased amounts of aid had an impact on various 
segments of society.  There was a shift of population from the rural areas to 
the urban areas, causing a rapid increase in the populations of the cities.  In 
addition, a rapid increase in Gross National Product (GNP) was beneficial 
for the economy; however, GNP per capita was still low compared to other 
countries.  Literacy rates as well as the amount of skilled workers increased 
rapidly in a short period of time.   
The effect of US personnel and aid also had other consequences that 
were possibly beneficial to Turks and Americans.  Goods that were 
exported to Turkey created a certain type of reliance on American goods, 
creating more dependency on the US.  In addition, Turks sent to the US to 
be trained came back with different sets of standards that they had 
acquired.  Some grew impatient with Turkey’s state and wanted to impose 
changes in the system.  US aid also spurred urban migration because more 
jobs were created in urban areas and, in turn, lost in rural regions.  
Gecekondu neighborhoods were evidence of the lack of affordable housing 
and services for those who made the move to the big city.  The large 
number of immigrants from the villages increased their political clout in 
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terms of politicians trying to appeal to this new group of voters interests.  
Also, sectors such as private industry were encouraged by Americans, 
serving as a factor in the growth of this industry.   
However, the rapid amount of growth had detrimental effects on the 
economy, as well.  For example, along with economic growth, inflation has 
played a major role in devaluing the currency.  In addition, the flood of 
rural farm workers has created urban slums, or gecekondu neighborhoods.  
Also, the income gap has increased, creating an even larger divide between 
rich and poor.  Farmers, a majority of the work force, earn well below the 
average of other groups.  The urban unemployment rate is about 11 
percent, whereas the rural rate is much higher (Burke, 199).   
The Turks tried to limit the impact of aid to agriculture by 
channeling the funds into sectors in agriculture that they thought might 
have the biggest impact on production without radically changing the 
status quo.  The original intent of aid to Turkey was to alleviate the 
problems of the East; however there was no clear-cut plan to target aid for 
any particular social need or purpose.  As a result, aid was doled out to 
sectors that showed the greatest amount of need or were the most useful to 
the US, but there was no specifically targeted outlet for the assistance.  This 
was in part useful since aid could be tailored according to specific needs, 
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but since it was not planned, it was difficult to evaluate the effect that aid 
had on a specific sector.   
However, the US aid program helped develop the industrial labor 
force along with the social structure that was required.  The mechanization 
of agriculture, the creation of heavy industry, and the developing of the 
road system all helped create new jobs for Turkish unskilled workers.  
Technical assistance from the US was used to train the workers who were 
the first to fill these positions.  US aid also contributed to the primary 
education system by donating school supplies so that the Turkish 
government could spend its funding on building new schools.  Investments 
were also made in training nurses at Ankara University and setting up 
agricultural research stations across the country.   
Several major universities, such as Ankara University, Middle East 
Technical University (METU), and Atatürk University, all received funding 
through loans and grants.  For example, Atatürk University Medical School 
received $2 million in 1970 for equipment and supplies (House Hearing, 
1971: 654).  METU received $4.5 million in 1970 but did not procure the 
loan immediately, mainly due to problems with student strikes, violence, 
and the resignation of the rector (House Hearing, 1971: 655).  It was hoped 
that supporting higher technical education would help improve economic 
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development in Turkey.  In general, most benefits were reaped by new 
institutions rather than old established ones.   
Although there were many benefits to US aid, it could be seen that 
these benefits mostly affected urban residents and well-to-do farmers.  Aid 
contributed to the unemployment problem by redistributing the jobs that 
were available, leaving a bigger segment of the population unemployed.  
The villages did not benefit as much as officials expected, although 
improved roads, increased access to the villages, and aid helped increase 
the number of schools available in rural areas.  However, incomes of 
farmers were still much lower than the national average.  Modernization 
did not alleviate the problems in all sectors of society as expected and was 
not able to change the basic structure of life of a majority of the population. 
 Besides the social impact of US aid on Turkey, there have also been 
wide reaching political repercussions.  A greater degree of participation in 
politics has been prevalent but has also been accompanied by increased 
amounts of conflict.  The groups in society that benefited most from aid 
like entrepreneurs and large land-holding farmers were able to strengthen 
their influence in society by increasing their political clout.  With the 
resources and the training they were better able to voice their concerns and 
participate in politics by making their demands known to society.  
Specifically, entrepreneurs were able to benefit from aid and US support.  
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Money was directly provided to support private enterprise and moral 
support was given to entrepreneurs.  Engineers and those technically 
educated through US schools or funding were made aware of the ways in 
which they could improve their country.   
The US has also been supportive of trade unions and their 
development within the Turkish work force.  Trade unions were directly 
funded by US interests, thus increasing their strength and ability to achieve 
their goals.  While strengthening certain sectors in society, power shifted 
from the original reformers to those given new voices by an improved 
economic situation.  However, bureaucrats were hurt most by the changes 
in the structure of the system.  Their incomes kept decreasing as a result of 
high levels of inflation.  The administrative system was targeted to change 
but many projects failed except for those that were of a technical nature.  
Technically oriented agencies were more flexible, since managers who 
already had a technical background were more willing to accept changes.   
The military also benefited from aid to the point where they 
assumed they could control the political currents of the country.  However, 
US aid, which contributed to large levels of inflation and devaluation of the 
Turkish Lira, decreased the purchasing power of the military.  This made 
the military even more dependent on aid from the US in order to 
modernize and improve troop conditions.  Since the military is one of the 
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most modernized sectors of society, it oftentimes became impatient with 
the slow progress made by the government.   
The US, in general, supported the political and military status quo in 
Turkey.  For example, during the rule of the Democrat Party (DP) from 
1950 to 1960, the US was mostly supportive of the aims of this party, 
especially its goal of enhancing private enterprise.  The US wanted to keep 
its ties with Turkey strong, and did not want to overemphasize the issue of 
reform with a government that was already attempting to make significant 
changes.  This high degree of support continued throughout the years of 
aid provided.  Even though the US would have preferred to see agriculture 
supported or the amount of exports increased rather than the development 
of industry, it was still satisfied with the changes made. 
The impact of improving roads on the political system may have 
been more far reaching than many expected.  Construction on the road 
networks to the villages has increased levels of participation from rural 
populations.  This could have a positive or negative effect on the political 
future of Turkey.  Participation from the villagers means greater levels of 
representative democracy, but also increases the influence of Islam in 
politics since most of the rural population is more religious than urban 
dwellers.  While parties such as the DP were able to come to power because 
they won the support of the villagers, the elite have lost a certain amount of 
 67
influence within the government.  From a western perspective, greater 
levels of participation in the government mean better levels of democracy. 
However, since the elite of Turkey are more likely to be Western 
educated and reform minded, less participation from this group could 
mean less advancement for the country.  Also, high levels of religious 
dedication on the part of the villagers could mix Islam with politics as it 
has with the AK Party’s rise to power.  As a result, improving the roads 
was a mixed blessing for the political system.  The US has most recently 
been disappointed with Turkey’s stance towards its efforts in Iraq.  This is 
mainly blamed on the new religious parties’ lack of enthusiasm towards 
getting involved with helping the US.  There have been many arguments 
purporting that the new religious regime is at fault for not supporting the 
US, and if it had not been for them, the US would not have experienced 
such a setback in its relationship with a longtime ally.  Since the rural 
regions have benefited from their strength in numbers, they have been able 
to significantly increase their political influence.  Also, politicians are better 
able to campaign in rural areas following improvements made on the roads 
without relying mainly on the influence of local officials.  This allows some 
villagers to ally with the national government and give less importance to 
their local leaders.  As a result, the national government strengthened their 
hold on the population of villages. 
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 Throughout this discussion of aid from the US, it has been apparent 
that changes in conditionality have occurred over the years.  Conditions 
were not always specifically placed on loans, but the procurement of the 
funds was intended for a specific purpose that the Turkish government 
was expected to fulfill.  The transition has gone from protecting against the 
Soviet threat, increasing privatization, enhancing democracy, and fostering 
development, to fulfilling security interests.  In the early years, conditions 
were not always directly placed on an individual loan, so it was easy for 
the recipients of the aid to spend it in ways not originally intended.  
However, when US officials worked with Turkish locals on a one-to-one 
basis, the likelihood of the money being spent where it was intended 
increased.  Over the years, the main intention of US aid to Turkey was 
security motivated (Senseş, 1999: 241).   
Until the last several decades, loans and grants received from the US 
have created a sense of dependency on the part of Turkey, in terms of 
confidence that the US will bail them out of significant financial woes.  An 
early example of this assumption was based upon a development plan 
written by Turkish specialists in 1947 where 40 percent of investments 
were purported to be financed by foreign aid (Senseş, 244).  Staunch 
supporters of agriculture, the US wanted to keep Turkey productive in this 
sector since Turkey had a comparative advantage or reduced per unit cost, 
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in this arrangement.  The notions of the US trying to control the 
development of agriculture resemble the imperialistic designs of 
superpowers before the formation of nation-states.  Whereas some 
dependency theorists argue that independence was necessary to 
Westernize (Gülalp, 1998: 957).  Also, the Turks would have preferred that 
the US funded industry, instead, slowing the industrial development of the 
country making it more dependent on US goods.  Throughout the 1960s, it 
was hoped that dependence on US aid would come to a close by the end of 
1977, as soon as the aid was received to narrow the gap between growth 
rates and investment and local resources (Senseş, 244).  The conditionality 
placed upon the loans was not intended to play a significant role in 
Turkey’s budget, but was specifically targeted to the goals of a given 
project.  This indicates the dependency that the Turkish government 
developed towards receiving aid from the US.  However, for the economy 
to be self-sufficient in the future less reliance on this type of income is 
essential or the risk of a colossal foreign debt could possibly retard 
economic growth.  The dependency created by US aid is significant and 
shares the responsibility with Europeans.  Europe and the US both take 
turns in their impact, one is not more significant than the other.  In order to 
become a competitive member of the EU, if Turkey so desires, it must 
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strengthen its economy to the point where it is no longer dependent on US 
aid. 
 
 
3.2 Aid from Europe to Turkey 
 
Ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the 
Tanzimat era, Turkey has continuously been under Western cultural, 
economic, and political influences.  More recently, Europeans have exerted 
pressure on Turkey to restructure its society and economy in order to join 
the European Union.  However, most Europeans, due to many factors, are 
skeptical about Turkey’s EU membership.  The Turkish government, along 
with most of the international community, has started to believe that 
reform and development go hand in hand with financial aid.  However, 
this dependency on foreign aid has created too much reliance on Europe on 
the part of Turkey.  Although the US provides financial assistance to 
Turkey, there is a lesser degree of US pressure to reform in order to receive 
the aid, in comparison to the conditionality imposed on Turkey by the 
Europeans.   
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Of late, some members of the Turkish elite, academia, and 
government have begun to resent the rules and regulations put in place by 
the Europeans and have started to look elsewhere for allies.  Alternatives 
are being examined through relations with Russia, former Russian 
republics, and the Middle East.  Withholding financial aid may be a 
possible tactic used by the Europeans to hold off Turkey’s membership to 
the EU.   
Turkey was already a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is 
intended to liberalize the economy and limit barriers to trade.  Presently, 
the most sought after goal in Turkish foreign policy is to become an EU 
member and benefit from the financial aid and other advantages provided 
by the Europeans.  However, financial aid, and the very promise of it, is 
detrimental to the internal development of Turkey. 
 The nature of changes in foreign aid within the international system 
are important to examine in order to understand the effects this could have 
on Turkey.  Starting with the end of the Second World War aid packages 
mainly consisted of funds to support investment plans in the recipient 
country through project assistance.  For example, governments would 
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design plans for development, which would then be approved and selected 
by donors.   
As the effectiveness of aid came into question in the 1980s, there was 
a shift towards aid for economic reforms, while developing new policy 
frameworks.  Countries were induced to stabilize, liberalize, and 
deregulate their economies in response to the 1982 Debt Crisis.  This shift 
occurred because of the lack of effective implementation of aid received by 
countries.  The less-developed countries experience higher levels of 
corruption within their infrastructures, thus lowering levels of 
transparency and the ability to trace aid recipients.   
Towards the 1990s another shift occurred through the donation of 
aid to countries with already “good” governance policies.  Rewarding 
countries that had taken measures to improve their infrastructure was seen 
as more effective than trying to induce change in countries with 
troublesome systems.  In recent years, Turkey has improved its 
bureaucracy in order to more effectively implement and control the influx 
of aid.  As a result, the EU has released more loans and funds for Turkey, 
but still not enough to make a substantial difference, especially in 
comparison to other countries. 
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 In the late 1950s, the European Community became concerned with 
defending the Mediterranean against Soviet military threats, so they 
perceived the cooperation and friendship of countries surrounding the 
Med as crucial.  Furthermore, the Mediterranean region comprised about 
15 percent of the ECs export market.  The EC decided to research and 
approach each country through a case-by-case basis and develop bilateral 
agreements.  Turkey was granted unlimited association with the goal of 
eventual membership under the Treaty of Rome in 1963.  The only other 
country in the region to receive such status was Greece, who eventually 
became a member while Turkey currently waits to join.  Even Spain was 
only granted a limited status in 1970, through unilateral trade concessions, 
but still managed to become an EU member while Turkey did not.  Also, 
Cyprus was given a much lower status than Turkey, but has already 
become a member.  It is interesting how these countries, in the beginning, 
were not considered to be as EU-ready as Turkey but have successfully 
become full members.   
Many claim that the EU is unwilling to admit Turkey because it is a 
Muslim nation, and this is the reason why the EU, being a “Christian club” 
has admitted countries like Spain and Greece ahead of Turkey.  In the early 
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1960s, the Europeans still remembered Turkey through the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire and the culture of fear of domination by the Turks 
remained in the psyches of many Europeans.  Another reason for 
preferential treatment of countries like Spain and Greece over Turkey in 
later years is the negative influence of Turkish workers in Europe.   
However, when the first laborers entered Germany, the image of 
Turkey changed all together.  Fear of domination shifted to contempt.  
Although Turkish workers mainly performed the jobs that Europeans were 
unwilling to do, they were still viewed as a threat in the workforce.  Many 
young Germans demonstrated in the streets because they felt their jobs 
were being threatened by Turkish laborers.  As Turkish workers started to 
move to other European countries, this negative image began to spread 
throughout Europe.  No longer were the Europeans likely to recall the 
splendors of the Ottoman Empire.  For this reason, most Europeans do not 
want Turkey to join the EU, and may be withholding aid as a tool to 
further hinder Turkey’s development and ability to fulfill the accession 
criteria.   
Furthermore, human rights issues in Turkey are not up to par with 
European standards.  This is another reason why foreign aid is oftentimes 
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withheld from Turkey.  Some sources claim that Turkey will use the 
foreign aid to fight against one of its ethnic minorities, the Kurds, in the 
South-East.  The Europeans fail to condemn their own history of ethnic 
repression against the Laps in Sweden and Norway, the Irish problem, and 
the Basque problem in France and Spain.   
The ability of minorities to integrate into the relatively homogenous 
societies of Europe is far less likely than in the United States.  Most 
immigrants live in concentrated regions of the metropolises and fail to 
integrate into the general population.  On the other hand, in the US most 
immigrants are eventually able to integrate fairly well into society without 
feeling too “isolated.”   
Another European complaint accounted for by Turkey is that the 
death penalty is unethical, even though it has not been exercised in Turkey 
since the 1980s.  They regard the death penalty as a mark of uncivilized 
society, and equate America with its death penalty even though the 
Americans execute prisoners more often than Turkey does.  These human 
rights difficulties are often cited against Turkey in its bid for EU 
membership.   
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Another argument used against Turkey is its large population in 
comparison to the other European nations, and the fear that it may surpass 
Germany in a little over a decade.  Representation in the European 
Commission, according to the new rules, is based on population.  If Turkey 
were to become a member, the Turkish representatives would dominate a 
significant component of the Commission.  Naturally, the Europeans 
would not want to have a state that is on the periphery of Europe, one 
which they do not even consider European, to dominate their parliament.  
Also, if Turkey were to become a member, some of the funding provided 
would be based on population, giving Turkey a large sum of the aid that is 
currently allocated for other less affluent members of the EU.   
Turkey, although a candidate for membership, does not receive 
structural funds to help carry out the reforms necessary to join the EU.  As 
a member of the European Customs Union, Turkey must open its markets 
to European goods, but does not receive subsidies like the poorer members 
of the EU.  As a result, Turkish products suffer from the competition that is 
presented by European goods.  A member of the GATT, Turkey finances its 
own compensation to make up for the reduction on tariffs.  The Uruguay 
Round, which was put into effect in 1996, liberalized the services sector.  
 77
This had the effect of opening up world markets in protected sectors such 
as agriculture, textiles, automobiles, and electronics.  For example, many 
Western countries were imposing voluntary export restraints (VERs) on 
Japanese cars so as to protect their own automotive industries.  If the 
Uruguay Round had not been implemented, these protectionist measures 
may have continued and grown to become excessive.   
For example, in Turkey foreign cars are much more expensive than 
locally made cars.  Turkey tries to adhere to the GATT principles and has 
made considerable headway in doing so, but is still not able to completely 
free up its markets.  Indeed, if foreign automobiles were as easy to buy as 
Turkish-made automobiles, no one would buy Turkish made vehicles.  
This is partly because of the reputation that foreign-made vehicles have 
obtained in comparison to Turkish cars as more reliable, longer lasting, and 
safer.   
Furthermore, trading with Europe has considerable drawbacks for 
Turkey since the Europeans are very stringent when it comes to quality 
control standards.  For example, in agriculture, the Germans continuously 
conduct tests on Turkish produce to see if it meets European standards.  
Since hormone and pesticide technology is newly developing in Turkey, 
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the Europeans are leery of whether the Turks can properly utilize these 
new agricultural technologies.  The Germans recently banned green 
peppers which were examined and determined to be cancerous.   
Also, because of the general dislike for Turkey among Europeans, 
Turkish products are viewed with distrust and are not able to compete as 
well as products from other countries in the European market.  However, 
there are exceptions, with companies like Vestel, and Alarko, to name a 
few.  On the other hand, within Turkey, European goods are often 
preferred over Turkish made products.  As a result, Turkish goods suffer in 
export markets towards the West as well as in their own markets.  Hence, 
without proper funds and subsidies from Europe, Turkey will have a hard 
time competing with other EU members. 
Of course the Europeans do not want to contribute to Turkey’s 
economy without receiving personal gain; they want certain reforms and 
changes to be put in place.  The problems with Turkey-EU accession will 
help understand the Copenhagen criteria and conditionality placed upon 
economic assistance to Turkey.  A prominent argument in the US 
concerning Mexico, is to try and improve the internal situation of the 
country so migrant laborers will not feel the need to immigrate to the US.  
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The same argument could be relevant for Turkey’s trying to improve 
conditions for the lower classes so they will not feel forced to search for a 
better life elsewhere.  On the flipside, improving internal conditions in 
Turkey will only draw it closer to EU membership.  For anti-Turkish 
elements in Europe it seems to be a no-win situation.  Either provide aid to 
improve Turkey’s situation for EU accession or be more accepting of 
Turkish laborers and their families.  
The main advantage that Europe would experience by allowing 
Turkey to join the EU is benefiting from its large army, which is the second 
largest in NATO.  A majority of the aid that is provided by Europe, in the 
early period, goes to the Turkish armed forces, although the contribution is 
not a great deal of capital in comparison to the US.  The Europeans stand to 
benefit from Turkey’s army, but point out that the army is too involved in 
politics.  On the one hand, it is advantageous for the army to be strong, but, 
on the other hand, the Europeans use the army as another argument for 
setbacks in EU accession for Turkey. 
More specifically, the Europeans desire a number of internal 
reforms.  To adopt the trade-related regulations of the customs union, legal 
reforms should be undertaken.  These reforms include legislative and 
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administrative reforms to protect intellectual, industrial, and commercial 
property rights.  Also, to adapt to the European internal market, Turkey 
developed a national antitrust law along with a national authority to 
enforce competition rules.  Consequently, Ankara must report all instances 
of state aid to a company, or group of enterprises, to Brussels and vice 
versa.  Both sides have the ability to object to aid that may violate 
European laws.   
These moves have a major impact on the reduction of the state role 
in the economy in Turkey.  One of the main problems in the Turkish 
economy since the foundation of the Republic has been the lack of private 
enterprise and dependence of businesses on the state for most of their 
actions and funding.  Now, with the help of the EU, more competition has 
emerged in the business sector and some of the country’s most prominent 
monopolies have started to face competition.  The goal of these new 
regulations is to reduce unfair competition and slowly integrate or make 
Turkey ready for the EU internal market.  As far as industrial goods are 
concerned, Turkey has been relatively integrated into the EU’s internal 
market.  In addition, economic and legal integration has already increased 
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with the customs union and will help Turkey make its possible entrance 
into the EU smoother. 
To help Turkey integrate its industry into the market the EU has 
promised to grant financial aid over a five year period in the amount of 
ECU375 million.  In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has 
promised loans that could reach ECU750 million.  Also, Turkey will have 
access to the Redirected Mediterranean Policy for structural investments in 
energy, the environment, communications, and transport.  So far, the EU 
has made many promises and not delivered on them.  Turkey has to prove 
that it will properly implement reform, adhere to conditionality, and use 
the money it is given wisely, before the EU will deliver on all its promises 
of aid.  For example, Turkey has only recently delegated the authority of 
dispersing the financial aid to certain institutions within the government.  
This has increased the relative transparency of how and where the aid is 
allocated.  However, with recent charges of corruption in the Russian Blue 
Stream pipeline scandal, levels of trust have been reduced in Europeans’ 
dealing with Turkish businessmen.   
Some of the progress that has been made towards EU criteria is in 
terms of reform in the structure.  During the July 2000 European Councils 
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of Helsinki and Fiera, a single framework was developed for coordinating 
all sources of pre-accession financial aid in one budget.  Prior to these 
councils, Turkey received aid from various different European countries, 
but now with a single budget it will make control of the aid much easier.  
In 2001 the “Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” the 
EU requested that Turkey develop new management structures for 
financial assistance.  As a result, the Minister of State, the Deputy Prime 
Minister of EU Affairs, the Minister of State of Economy, the Under-
Secretariat of the Treasury, and the Prime Minister’s office were given the 
task to coordinate aid from the EU.  If the proper institutions are set up to 
dole out aid efficiently, then the EU might be more willing to send money 
if it knows its going to be used as intended. 
European aid to Turkey has been scant in comparison to aid from 
other countries.  From Table 1 below during the period from 1966 to 1970 
only Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands contributed to Turkey’s 
financial aid package.  Italy contributed a generous amount of assistance to 
Turkey, in comparison to other countries.  Countries such as Zaire, 
Rwanda, Burundi, Tunisia, India, Israel, Pakistan, Indonesia, Surinam, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Malawi, and Cote d’Ivoire all received more 
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aid from EU members than Turkey.  The most generous country towards 
Turkey was Italy, and the most parsimonious was the Netherlands, while 
France omitted Turkey all together.  Turkey ranked in the middle among 
states receiving aid from Europe, but is one of the most strategic nations in 
comparison.  Turkey received a little over $30 million in aid in the 1960s. 
Table 1- The European Aid Donors and Their Major Recipients, 1966-70 
Donor Total Aid in US$ Aid as % of GNP Turkey- $ and Ranking 
Belgium 489 million 0.46 2.2 million, #6/10 
Germany 2,653 million 0.32 5.7 million, #4/10 
Italy 56 million 0.16 13.4 million, #2/10 
Netherlands 670 million 0.61 1.7 million, #7/10 
EEC 740 million - 7.2 million, #4/10 
Source 1-Holdar, Sven. "European Foreign Aid. South, East, Both, or Neither?” 
 
 Ten years later the picture only got worse for Turkey.  This time, 
only Germany and the European Economic Community (EEC) general 
fund provided about $16 million total for Turkey.  The other European 
countries decided to spend their money elsewhere.  Perhaps as the years 
progressed, and the reputation of Turkey became less and less prominent, 
this was reflected in the amount of aid it received.  Furthermore, as Turkey 
expressed a stronger desire to join the EU, less money came its way to help 
reform its infrastructure.  Loans in the form of specific project grants are 
available to a significant degree.  However, the Turkish government 
contributes almost the same amount as the EU to many projects.  Without 
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EU interest, some of these projects may not have even been undertaken.  
Successful completion of these projects makes Turkey more EU-ready, but 
also increases Turkey’s dependence on the EU for reforms it could be 
achieving on its own. 
 Turkey, a long-time ally of the West and a developing country 
trying to improve its position in the world order, receives a small amount 
of aid in comparison to other countries that are of less importance to the 
world order and international stability.  The Europeans might be better 
served by reconsidering their attitude towards Turkey, as this nation 
strengthens its ties with its neighbors to the east and north.  By skimping 
on foreign aid to Turkey, Europeans may lose a valuable ally to the East, 
which is necessary during times of terrorism and turmoil in the Middle 
East.  
 Conditionality over time has changed with respect to Turkey and 
the aid it receives from Europe.  In the early period, aid to Turkey from 
Europe was mostly targeted toward development assistance.  Each 
individual country in Europe chose its own particular amount to contribute 
to Turkey’s cause.  Even though the Europeans could have benefited from 
contributing to strengthen Turkey’s military to serve as a buffer zone to the 
East, a great deal of aid was not allocated for this cause.  European 
 85
disregard for strengthening any military institution is understandable 
given the aftermath of what they endured in the post-WWI and WWII 
periods.   
 With Turkey’s bid for EU membership, loans and grants have been 
attached with conditionality of adherence to EC-Turkey Agreements and 
the Copenhagen Criteria to guarantee “democratic principles, the rule of 
law, human rights and fundamental freedoms and international law” 
(Proposal for a Council Regulation, 2001: 5-6).  Since the Helsinki Summit, 
non-reimbursable grants made available to Turkey have increased to 200 
million Euros (EU Programmes, 2004: 2).  Presently, some of the conditions 
that the EU placed on program grants include improvements on: drug 
addiction, public health, discrimination, gender equality, social exclusion, 
and employment (EU Programmes, 70).  The EU can effectively promote its 
socialist agenda on Turkey, which willingly takes on reforms to ensure its 
eventual membership.   
However, when applying reforms, levels of dependency are high 
upon the EU.  Rather than undertaking reforms on its own, the government 
links its actions to the EU.  The EU is content that it can press its agenda 
upon Turkey and sees that its conditions are being fulfilled, because of 
their specificity and close monitoring by the EU.  Without close monitoring 
by the EU, Turkish attempts to make these reforms single-handedly could 
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lead to political unrest.  Turkish citizens might very well question the 
government’s desire to overhaul certain laws or government institutions.  
For example, reforming the retirement system in Turkey increased the 
retirement age.  If politicians had taken on this act on their own they would 
have been met with far-reaching opposition from the public; however, with 
the reasoning that reforms are being undertaken for EU alignment, the 
general public reaction would not be as negative.  If Turkey eventually 
becomes a full member of the EU, its reliance on Europe for reforms will 
stabilize and not create such a dependency problem. 
 
 
3.3 Aid from the World Bank 
 
 IFIs are another major source of aid for Turkey.  One of the most 
important IFIs is the World Bank.  The World Bank was founded at the 
same time as the IMF at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.  The main 
goal of the World Bank is to channel the earnings of the developed 
countries to the developing countries, in order to increase the standard of 
living and decrease poverty by providing project and program credits 
(Eğilmez, Kumcu: 2002, 71).  The World Bank has 183 members and $186.4 
billion worth of capital.  Each member country is required to send a 
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representative to the Governor’s Council who will vote and work for his or 
her country.  The core members are the US, Germany, Japan, France, and 
the UK.   
Turkey was one of the initial recipients of a World Bank structural 
adjustment loan (SAL) and was the only country to receive a total of five 
SALs.  In addition, one-third of all SAL loans between 1980 and 1986 were 
allocated to Turkey.  The World Bank claims that its project with Turkey 
was successful (Morrissey, 1995: 295).  The reforms, the extent and speed of 
implementation are all important factors in the relative success of the 
project.  Conditionality on the loans include certain reforms of the economy 
that must be undertaken by Turkey in order to receive the funding.   
These reforms include changes in the exchange rate, trade policy, 
taxation and public spending, public enterprises, financial sector, industry 
and energy policy, and agricultural policy (Morrissey, 298).  Some detailed 
examples of the changes that would turn the nature of reform from an 
inward oriented strategy to an outward oriented strategy are as follows.  In 
terms of exchange rate reforms, these were intended to enhance incentives 
for exporters and improve the administrative structure for exports.  
Reforms of trade policy included developing export credit insurance, 
reducing administrative procedures for exports, studying protectionism, 
and liberalizing imports.  In relation to the tax system, restructuring was 
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encouraged along with a strengthening of the tax administration.  Next, 
revising public investment was encouraged through reorienting it to 
infrastructure and concentrating on high priority projects.  In the financial 
sector, savings was to be encouraged by real rates of interest and the 
establishment of a Capital Market Commission.  Energy sector investments 
were to be made in developing domestic energy sources.   
In general, the compliance rate with these projects was good 
especially in the exchange rate and export promotion division (Morrissey, 
302).  Satisfactory compliance was seen in reducing the budget deficit and 
increasing public investment.  Reforms were neglected in the reduction of 
import restrictions, reduction of staffing in public enterprise, access to 
credit, legislative reforms, and internal reforms.  The rate of 
implementation of these reforms varies from speedy to gradual.  Rapid 
reforms tend to be more effective since they are implemented without 
giving too much chance for opposition to emerge.  However, gradual 
reforms can oftentimes be more successful since they have a more natural 
integration into the system.  Many of these reforms were made without 
altering the political system, which shows that the World Bank can provide 
aid for solely economic purposes without political motivations.   
 World Bank conditionality in SALs for Turkey mostly focused on 
trade policy and only showed implementation of export promotion 
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conditions; public sector conditionality did not exhibit full compliance 
(Morrissey, 1995: 318).  Some conditions were industrial related; however, 
no conditions were set upon agriculture or labor treatment.  Oliver 
Morrissey (1995: 318) makes the observation that the Bank should become 
more flexible in regards to enforcing its strict conditions upon countries.  In 
later years, the Bank saw fit to make certain adjustments in its lending and 
conditionality requirements.  
The World Bank has most recently changed its guidelines for policy-
based lending while making conditionality country-specific because the 
institution has concluded that Adjustment Lending is not as effective as 
Development Policy Lending (World Bank, 2004).  More than just a name 
change, conditionality was originally specified for certain programs 
whereas now it will be specified according to each individual country.  The 
World Bank has found that it will specifically work with each country to 
determine conditions that are exclusively targeted for the country in 
question.  Also, funding will be provided for completed projects rather 
than proposed projects.  While the Bank’s program has been deemed 
successful, it also created levels of dependency on the funds provided.  
Morrissey (1995: 315) points out that the funds that arrived opened the way 
for a potential debt crisis.  The Turkish government became confidant that 
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it could merely take out another SAL if deemed necessary by state 
economists.   
 
 
3.4 Aid from the International Monetary Fund 
 
 The IMF was the other important IFI founded at the famous Bretton 
Woods conference.  Turkey first joined the IMF, three years after it was 
founded, in 1947 with a quota of $43 million, which meant that Turkey had 
a right to draw up to $43 million in the event of a financial crisis.  The 
government believed it was only proper to withdraw money during a crisis 
in order to pay off foreign debts.  Since 1947, the quota increased to $70 
million in 1967, $151 million in 1970, $200 million in 1979, and in 2001 up to 
$964 million.  When Turkey first started borrowing from the IMF in the late 
1940s, it borrowed approximately $30 million up until the mid 1950s.  The 
standard amount borrowed each year until 1970 ranged from $32 million to 
$55 million; then Turkey started borrowing anywhere from $132 million to 
$4 billion.  Turkey has borrowed approximately a total of $7.2 billion in 
2001 and is the organizations seventh largest borrower.7   
                                            
7 Turkey is seventh after Mexico, Russia, Korea, Argentina, India, and England 
(Alpago: 2002, 95). 
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It has signed 18 stand-by agreements with the IMF since 1960.  Some 
blame the failure of Turkey in not using the loans obtained from the IMF in 
the proper way, on the greater amount of attention paid to funding 
modernization (Şanli: 2002, 135).  For example, the army and defense was 
funded instead of general sectors of the economy that might have been in 
need of more development.  However, after the earthquake of August 1999 
more funding came in and was targeted in sectors that were considered 
more necessary.   
Some argue that the IMF is designed to increase ties between the US 
and the third world, thus, making the third world dependent on the US to 
bail it out of various economic crises (Şanli, 202).  In some poor African 
countries, in order to pay off their debts, have shifted agricultural 
production to cash crops rather than staple crop production.  Along with 
paying off their debt to the IMF, these countries struggle with paying the 
interest on their loans.  The former president of Tanzania commented that, 
in order to pay off the country’s debts, it was necessary to starve its 
children to death (Şanli, 201).  The IMF is able to pressure small countries 
with little political power to pay off their debt whereas more powerful 
countries can postpone their payments.  Also, these countries have the 
ability to pull capital from various sources whereas poorer countries may 
be more limited as to where they can get funding.  As a result, loans from 
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the IMF can do serious damage to a country’s foundations and lead to 
investment solely to make quick profits. 
 Conditionality on IMF funding was very specific.  For example, the 
program for Turkey in 1980 consisted of many stipulations including: 
reduction of government involvement in production encouraging market 
forces, an export oriented strategy of import substitution, enhancing 
foreign investment, reducing subsidies in agriculture, removing certain 
price controls, and institutional changes through the creation of a Money 
and Credit Committee (Kirkpatrick and Onis, 1991: 12).  Conditions were 
filled in part and remained on the target list when not completed.  The 
nature of IMF conditionality remained similar over the years, shifting its 
emphasis to reducing high levels of inflation.  The IMF played a large role 
in creating dependence upon assistance to Turkey’s economy.  It was 
important to be free of the IMF and never dependent upon it again 
(Kumcu, 2004: 86).  Turkey faithfully paid back many of its loans and tried 
to fulfill the conditions which were very country specific, increasing their 
effectiveness. 
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3.5 Aid from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
 
The OECD, an organization headquartered in Paris, is responsible 
for disbursing Agency for International Development (AID) funds 
allocated to Turkey.  In 1979, the OECD promised $916 million in order to 
bail Turkey out of its balance of payments emergency.  By April of 1980 
only half of that money was allocated for use because most of it was 
commodity or project credits that the Turkish government could not 
directly use (Senate Report, 1980: 9).  The greatest amount of support for 
Turkey came from West Germany and the US in order to influence the 
OECD in providing more funding at better rates.8  Part of the problem with 
the fiscal equilibrium in Turkey is the lack of revenue collected from taxes.  
The relative amount of tax revenue compared to GNP is the lowest in the 
OECD area.  Sixty percent of Turkey’s trade is with OECD countries. 
Besides the aid aspect, the OECD also publishes reports on the state 
of various advancements and reforms in Turkey.  For example, it recently 
published a report on scientific studies carried out by various agencies.  
Research on seismology, molecular biology, genetic engineering, 
                                            
8 Other countries providing OECD funding for Turkey in 1981 include: Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  Finland was excluded (House Hearing: 1983: 151). 
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biotechnology, the Turkish brain drain, and globalization are all being 
carried out by various research oriented groups.9  Another such report is 
prepared on the environment.  Turkey has made significant advances in 
developing plans to protect its environment especially in the big cities.  
Also, tourism becomes an issue with the influx of millions of vacationers 
each year to the Mediterranean coast.  As a research organization, the 
OECD helps increase the amount of transparency in the system regarding 
how certain funding may be used by Turkey, and how improvements are 
being made.  
 In terms of OECD conditionality, it was based on policy reforms and 
sometimes agreement on IMF stabilization programs.  Turkey was seen as 
playing a pivotal role in protecting NATOs southern flank from Soviet 
influence during the Cold War.  Thus, Turkey’s economic and political 
weakness had to be prevented by outside sources of funding (Kirkpatrick 
and Onis, 13).  Another event that increased aid for Turkey was the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, increasing the urgency of resolving Turkey’s 
difficulties.  The OECD was another institution that increased Turkey’s 
dependence on the West for economic support.  Not as well known as the 
IMF, the OECD did not have as controversial a reputation when it came to 
                                            
9 These groups include: the Ministry of Defense, Higher Education Council, 
Under-secretariat of Defense Industry, the Scientific and Technical Research Council of 
Turkey (TÜBİTAK), Technology Development Foundation of Turkey (TTGV) and the 
Turkish Telecommunication Corporation (TURK TELEKOM). 
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public opinion.  As a result, OECD conditionality would have been more 
easily implemented without governmental efforts to pretend that IMF 
conditions were actually thought up by the Turkish government. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Turkey’s future can be said to be tied to its past.  The amount of 
economic assistance that Turkey has received over the years definitely had 
an effect on the progress that was made towards development or not.  If 
foreign aid over the years has not created too much dependence, Turkey 
will be better off in years to come, since it will be able to stand on its own 
feet economically.  Problems with the economy and the recent economic 
crisis will hopefully be left behind.  With the most recent events in 
international politics in relation to the Iraq War of 2003, some interesting 
developments have transpired.  Turkey is caught in the middle of two 
super powers, both vying for her support as an ally. 
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All the years that Turkey has been receiving aid from the West it has 
developed a sort of dependency upon the superpowers.  By providing aid 
to developing countries the West tries to guarantee that these countries will 
be financially dependent upon them.  This would have a detrimental effect 
on Turkey’s development and economy in the long term.  If Turkey knew 
that every time there was a problem, the superpowers would be ready to 
bail her out, then she would be less likely to take economic mishaps 
seriously.  Also, rather than trying to develop industry by her own means, 
she looks to the West for funding.   
It is questionable whether Turkey would be in a better position 
today if so much aid had not been dumped into the economy.  On the 
flipside, maybe Turkey would have benefited from greater amounts of aid 
to develop various projects and sectors of the economy.  However, in 
recent years those providing the aid have started to establish stricter 
regulations on the implementation of aid and have required the setting up 
of various institutions in order to dole out the aid.  These improvements 
will hopefully lead to the more effective implementation of aid thus, 
increasing its relative level of effectiveness.  Thus, conditionality has 
evolved throughout the years from attempting to guarantee democracy to 
improving the general well-being of the economy. 
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The economy in Turkey is problematic because there is an imbalance 
between interest rates, inflation, and exchange rates.  In order to achieve 
stability, domestic interest rates must be kept higher than inflation and at 
the same time controlling exchange rates to be in line with consumer and 
wholesale prices.  Certain problems with the public sector and the 
preservation of statist policies are the main burden on the economy, as 
stated in conditionality requirements of the numerous IFIs. 
Even before and certainly following the major economic crisis of 
2001 the IMF pledged $19 billion to Turkey and the World Bank extended 
credits.  Both threatened that May 2001 would be the last time for 
assistance.  As a result of the recession, the Turkish Lira (TL) lost 40 percent 
of its value, the economy shrank, and unemployment rates increased.  This 
time, lenders required greater reforms in various sectors in order to help 
alleviate structural problems for the short-term.  The Turkish Lira was 
floated after this crisis, causing a 40 percent reduction in its value.  Banks 
also suffered a great deal from the crisis.  The main problem with the banks 
was either that they were state run and a tool for politicians to influence 
voters or they were run corruptly by incompetent individuals.   
In the wake of this economic crisis, the state of the economy has 
made some improvements for Turkey’s future.  For example, inflation has 
reached targeted rates and has fallen to approximately 30 percent.  Also, 
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the exchange rates for the Dollar and the Euro have remained relatively 
low and stable.  If the economy continues to move in this direction, the 
outlook will be positive for Turkey, reducing dependence on foreign aid. 
Turkey’s reaction to the most recent Iraq War came as a bit of a 
surprise to the US government.  After all, the US had supplied a great deal 
of aid for the Turkish military over the years.  This aid was not provided 
for development purposes, but was given with the intentions that the US 
will eventually benefit from a stronger Turkish army.  However, with 
Turkey’s recent reaction to US desires to establish a northern front for the 
war at Turkey’s south-eastern border, the Department of Defense was 
taken by surprise.  Ever since the end of WWII, it had been pushing for 
military aid to Turkey in order to guarantee support in the event of a 
Middle Eastern crisis.  Department of Defense lobbyists had always 
pointed out how Turkey was a steadfast ally when compared to other 
countries in the region such as Greece.  This recent event, however, has 
functioned as a black mark on Turkey’s record as a dependable ally to the 
US.  Turkey was only able to open its air space for use by the US Air Force.  
Even such a small contribution by Turkey caused a stir in Europe, which 
was against the war.  Turkey’s failure to assist the US in its endeavors in 
Iraq does not mean that it will never receive military aid ever again.  
However, this episode does give anti-Turkish lobbyists one more example 
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of reasons why Turkey should not be given aid.  In addition, those in 
support of Turkey will be put under pressure in Congress to answer tough 
questions regarding Turkey’s recent behavior.  With regards to the Kurdish 
question, Turkey cannot have much to complain about its eventual 
outcome, without participation in its development.  Moving away from its 
devoted relationship to the US, Turkey might develop closer ties to the EU. 
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